# UGA Round 2 v Florida KV

## 1NC

### Agamben

#### The affirmative’s emphasis on cybersecurity as a solution cedes control to elites who then deem acts legitimate – culminates in the exclusion of all those deemed potential hackers or threats to techno-utopia

HANSEN AND NISSENBAUM 2009 (Lene, Associate Professor, Director of the Ph.d. Program, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. AND\*\*\* Helen, Professor, New York University, Media, Culture, and Communication & Computer Science, Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School, International Studies Quarterly (2009) 53, 1155–1175)

As in most academic fields, computer scientists have disagreed on the likelihood of different forms of attacks, and since the field is also cloaked in military or business secrecy, the ‘‘normal’’ follower of these debates learns ‘‘that much is withheld or simply not known, and estimates of damage strategically either wildly exaggerated or understated’’ (Nissenbaum 2005:72). These fluctuations also facilitate a coupling of radical threats with techno-utopian solutions.11 The National Strategy (2003:35) for instance couples a series of securitizations with an exuberant faith in the development of ‘‘highly secure, trust-worthy, and resilient computer systems. In the future, working with a computer, the Internet, or any other cyber system may become as dependable as turning on the lights or the water.’’ Leaving aside that for the majority of the world’s poor, and even for the impoverished American, turning on the light or water may not be entirely dependable, this echoes a technological utopianism that sidesteps the systemic, inherent ontological insecurity that computer scientists consistently emphasize. It also invokes an inherent tension between disaster and utopia as the future of cyber security. The constitution of expert authority in cyber technifications invokes furthermore the tenuous relationship between ‘‘good’’ knowledge and ‘‘bad’’ knowledge, between the computer scientist and the hacker. The hacker, argues Nissenbaum (2004), has undergone a critical shift in Western policy and media discourse, moving from a previous subject position as geeky, apolitical, and driven by the boyish challenge of breaking the codes to one of thieves, vandals, and even terrorists.12 Although ‘‘hackers’’ as well as others speaking on behalf of ‘‘hacktivista’’—the use of hacking for dissident, normatively desirable purposes— have tried to reclaim the term (Deibert 2003), both official and dissident discourse converge in their underscoring of the general securitization of the cyber sector insofar as past political hacker naivety is no longer possible. The privileged role allocated to computer and information scientists within cyber security discourse is in part a product of the logic of securitization itself: if cyber security is so crucial it should not be left to amateurs. Computer scientists and engineers are however not only experts, but technical ones and to constitute cyber security as their domain is to technify cyber security. Technifications are, as securitizations, speech acts that ‘‘do something’’ rather than merely describe, and they construct an issue as reliant upon technical, expert knowledge, but they also simultaneously presuppose a politically and normatively neutral agenda that technology serves. The mobilization of technification within a logic of securitization is thus one that allows for a particular constitution of epistemic authority and political legitimacy (Huysmans 2006:6–9). It constructs the technical as a domain requiring an expertise that the public (and most politicians) do not have and this in turn allows ‘‘experts’’ to become securitizing actors while distinguishing themselves from the ‘‘politicking’’ of politicians and other ‘‘political’’ actors. Cyber security discourse’s simultaneous securitization and technification work to prevent it from being politicized in that it is precisely through rational, technical discourse that securitization may ‘‘hide’’ its own political roots.13 The technical and the securitized should therefore not be seen as opposed realms or disjunct discursive modalities, but as deployable in complex, interlocking ways; not least by those securitizing actors who seek to depoliticize their discourses’ threat and enemy constructions through linkages to ‘‘neutral’’ technologies. A securitization by contrast inevitably draws public attention to what is done in the name of security and this provides a more direct point of critical engagement for those wishing to challenge these practices than if these were constituted as technical.

#### Sanitization of US policy leads to endless violence and imperialism – turns case

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[A. J., retired career officer in the United States Army, former director of Boston University's Center for International Relations (from 1998 to 2005), The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War, 2005 accessed 9-4-13, mss]

Today as never before in their history Americans are enthralled with military power. The global military supremacy that the United States presently enjoys--and is bent on perpetuating-has become central to our national identity. More than America's matchless material abundance or even the effusions of its pop culture, the nation's arsenal of high-tech weaponry and the soldiers who employ that arsenal have come to signify who we are and what we stand for. When it comes to war, Americans have persuaded themselves that the United States possesses a peculiar genius. Writing in the spring of 2003, the journalist Gregg Easterbrook observed that "the extent of American military superiority has become almost impossible to overstate." During Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces had shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that they were "the strongest the world has ever known, . . . stronger than the Wehrmacht in r94o, stronger than the legions at the height of Roman power." Other nations trailed "so far behind they have no chance of catching up. ""˜ The commentator Max Boot scoffed at comparisons with the German army of World War II, hitherto "the gold standard of operational excellence." In Iraq, American military performance had been such as to make "fabled generals such as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian seem positively incompetent by comparison." Easterbrook and Booz concurred on the central point: on the modern battlefield Americans had located an arena of human endeavor in which their flair for organizing and deploying technology offered an apparently decisive edge. As a consequence, the United States had (as many Americans have come to believe) become masters of all things military. Further, American political leaders have demonstrated their intention of tapping that mastery to reshape the world in accordance with American interests and American values. That the two are so closely intertwined as to be indistinguishable is, of course, a proposition to which the vast majority of Americans subscribe. Uniquely among the great powers in all of world history, ours (we insist) is an inherently values-based approach to policy. Furthermore, we have it on good authority that the ideals we espouse represent universal truths, valid for all times. American statesmen past and present have regularly affirmed that judgment. In doing so, they validate it and render it all but impervious to doubt. Whatever momentary setbacks the United States might encounter, whether a generation ago in Vietnam or more recently in Iraq, this certainty that American values are destined to prevail imbues U.S. policy with a distinctive grandeur. The preferred language of American statecraft is bold, ambitious, and confident. Reflecting such convictions, policymakers in Washington nurse (and the majority of citizens tacitly endorse) ever more grandiose expectations for how armed might can facilitate the inevitable triumph of those values. In that regard, George W. Bush's vow that the United States will "rid the world of evil" both echoes and amplifies the large claims of his predecessors going at least as far back as Woodrow Wilson. Coming from Bush the war- rior-president, the promise to make an end to evil is a promise to destroy, to demolish, and to obliterate it. One result of this belief that the fulfillment of America's historic mission begins with America's destruction of the old order has been to revive a phenomenon that C. Wright Mills in the early days of the Cold War described as a "military metaphysics"-a tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military means. To state the matter bluntly, Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism, manifesting itself in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. To a degree without precedent in U.S. history, Americans have come to define the nation's strength and well-being in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals? Already in the 19905 America's marriage of a militaristic cast of mind with utopian ends had established itself as the distinguishing element of contemporary U.S. policy. The Bush administrations response to the hor- rors of 9/11 served to reaffirm that marriage, as it committed the United States to waging an open-ended war on a global scale. Events since, notably the alarms, excursions, and full-fledged campaigns comprising the Global War on Terror, have fortified and perhaps even sanctified this marriage. Regrettably, those events, in particular the successive invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, advertised as important milestones along the road to ultimate victory have further dulled the average Americans ability to grasp the significance of this union, which does not serve our interests and may yet prove our undoing. The New American Militarism examines the origins and implications of this union and proposes its annulment. Although by no means the first book to undertake such an examination, The New American Militarism does so from a distinctive perspective. The bellicose character of U.S. policy after 9/11, culminating with the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, has, in fact, evoked charges of militarism from across the political spectrum. Prominent among the accounts advancing that charge are books such as The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, by Chalmers Johnson; Hegemony or Survival: Americas Quest for Global Dominance, by Noam Chomsky; Masters of War; Militarism and Blowback in the Era of American Empire, edited by Carl Boggs; Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions, by Clyde Prestowitz; and Incoherent Empire, by Michael Mann, with its concluding chapter called "The New Militarism." Each of these books appeared in 2003 or 2004. Each was not only writ- ten in the aftermath of 9/11 but responded specifically to the policies of the Bush administration, above all to its determined efforts to promote and justify a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. As the titles alone suggest and the contents amply demonstrate, they are for the most part angry books. They indict more than explain, and what- ever explanations they offer tend to be ad hominem. The authors of these books unite in heaping abuse on the head of George W Bush, said to combine in a single individual intractable provincialism, religious zealotry, and the reckless temperament of a gunslinger. Or if not Bush himself, they fin- ger his lieutenants, the cabal of warmongers, led by Vice President Dick Cheney and senior Defense Department officials, who whispered persua- sively in the president's ear and used him to do their bidding. Thus, accord- ing to Chalmers Johnson, ever since the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, Cheney and other key figures from that war had "Wanted to go back and finish what they started." Having lobbied unsuccessfully throughout the Clinton era "for aggression against Iraq and the remaking of the Middle East," they had returned to power on Bush's coattails. After they had "bided their time for nine months," they had seized upon the crisis of 9/1 1 "to put their theories and plans into action," pressing Bush to make Saddam Hussein number one on his hit list." By implication, militarism becomes something of a conspiracy foisted on a malleable president and an unsuspecting people by a handful of wild-eyed ideologues. By further implication, the remedy for American militarism is self-evi- dent: "Throw the new militarists out of office," as Michael Mann urges, and a more balanced attitude toward military power will presumably reassert itself? As a contribution to the ongoing debate about U.S. policy, The New American Militarism rejects such notions as simplistic. It refuses to lay the responsibility for American militarism at the feet of a particular president or a particular set of advisers and argues that no particular presidential election holds the promise of radically changing it. Charging George W. Bush with responsibility for the militaristic tendencies of present-day U.S. for- eign policy makes as much sense as holding Herbert Hoover culpable for the Great Depression: Whatever its psychic satisfactions, it is an exercise in scapegoating that lets too many others off the hook and allows society at large to abdicate responsibility for what has come to pass. The point is not to deprive George W. Bush or his advisers of whatever credit or blame they may deserve for conjuring up the several large-scale campaigns and myriad lesser military actions comprising their war on ter- ror. They have certainly taken up the mantle of this militarism with a verve not seen in years. Rather it is to suggest that well before September 11, 2001 , and before the younger Bush's ascent to the presidency a militaristic predisposition was already in place both in official circles and among Americans more generally. In this regard, 9/11 deserves to be seen as an event that gave added impetus to already existing tendencies rather than as a turning point. For his part, President Bush himself ought to be seen as a player reciting his lines rather than as a playwright drafting an entirely new script. In short, the argument offered here asserts that present-day American militarism has deep roots in the American past. It represents a bipartisan project. As a result, it is unlikely to disappear anytime soon, a point obscured by the myopia and personal animus tainting most accounts of how we have arrived at this point. The New American Militarism was conceived not only as a corrective to what has become the conventional critique of U.S. policies since 9/11 but as a challenge to the orthodox historical context employed to justify those policies. In this regard, although by no means comparable in scope and in richness of detail, it continues the story begun in Michael Sherry's masterful 1995 hook, In the Shadow of War an interpretive history of the United States in our times. In a narrative that begins with the Great Depression and spans six decades, Sherry reveals a pervasive American sense of anxiety and vulnerability. In an age during which War, actual as well as metaphorical, was a constant, either as ongoing reality or frightening prospect, national security became the axis around which the American enterprise turned. As a consequence, a relentless process of militarization "reshaped every realm of American life-politics and foreign policy, economics and technology, culture and social relations-making America a profoundly different nation." Yet Sherry concludes his account on a hopeful note. Surveying conditions midway through the post-Cold War era's first decade, he suggests in a chapter entitled "A Farewell to Militarization?" that America's preoccupation with War and military matters might at long last be waning. In the mid- 1995, a return to something resembling pre-1930s military normalcy, involving at least a partial liquidation of the national security state, appeared to be at hand. Events since In the Shadow of War appear to have swept away these expectations. The New American Militarism tries to explain why and by extension offers a different interpretation of America's immediate past. The upshot of that interpretation is that far from bidding farewell to militariza- tion, the United States has nestled more deeply into its embrace. f ~ Briefly told, the story that follows goes like this. The new American militarism made its appearance in reaction to the I96os and especially to Vietnam. It evolved over a period of decades, rather than being sponta- neously induced by a particular event such as the terrorist attack of Septem- ber 11, 2001. Nor, as mentioned above, is present-day American militarism the product of a conspiracy hatched by a small group of fanatics when the American people were distracted or otherwise engaged. Rather, it devel- oped in full view and with considerable popular approval. The new American militarism is the handiwork of several disparate groups that shared little in common apart from being intent on undoing the purportedly nefarious effects of the I96OS. Military officers intent on reha- bilitating their profession; intellectuals fearing that the loss of confidence at home was paving the way for the triumph of totalitarianism abroad; reli- gious leaders dismayed by the collapse of traditional moral standards; strategists wrestling with the implications of a humiliating defeat that had undermined their credibility; politicians on the make; purveyors of pop cul- turc looking to make a buck: as early as 1980, each saw military power as the apparent answer to any number of problems. The process giving rise to the new American militarism was not a neat one. Where collaboration made sense, the forces of reaction found the means to cooperate. But on many occasions-for example, on questions relating to women or to grand strategy-nominally "pro-military" groups worked at cross purposes. Confronting the thicket of unexpected developments that marked the decades after Vietnam, each tended to chart its own course. In many respects, the forces of reaction failed to achieve the specific objectives that first roused them to act. To the extent that the 19603 upended long-standing conventions relating to race, gender, and sexuality, efforts to mount a cultural counterrevolution failed miserably. Where the forces of reaction did achieve a modicum of success, moreover, their achievements often proved empty or gave rise to unintended and unwelcome conse- quences. Thus, as we shall see, military professionals did regain something approximating the standing that they had enjoyed in American society prior to Vietnam. But their efforts to reassert the autonomy of that profession backfired and left the military in the present century bereft of meaningful influence on basic questions relating to the uses of U.S. military power. Yet the reaction against the 1960s did give rise to one important by-prod: uct, namely, the militaristic tendencies that have of late come into full flower. In short, the story that follows consists of several narrative threads. No single thread can account for our current outsized ambitions and infatua- tion with military power. Together, however, they created conditions per- mitting a peculiarly American variant of militarism to emerge. As an antidote, the story concludes by offering specific remedies aimed at restor- ing a sense of realism and a sense of proportion to U.S. policy. It proposes thereby to bring American purposes and American methods-especially with regard to the role of military power-into closer harmony with the nation's founding ideals. The marriage of military metaphysics with eschatological ambition is a misbegotten one, contrary to the long-term interests of either the American people or the world beyond our borders. It invites endless war and the ever-deepening militarization of U.S. policy. As it subordinates concern for the common good to the paramount value of military effectiveness, it promises not to perfect but to distort American ideals. As it concentrates ever more authority in the hands of a few more concerned with order abroad rather than with justice at home, it will accelerate the hollowing out of American democracy. As it alienates peoples and nations around the world, it will leave the United States increasingly isolated. If history is any guide, it will end in bankruptcy, moral as well as economic, and in abject failure. "Of all the enemies of public liberty," wrote James Madison in 1795, "war is perhaps the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies. From these proceed debts and taxes. And armies, debts and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few .... No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual Warfare." The purpose of this book is to invite Americans to consider the continued relevance of Madison's warning to our own time and circumstances.

#### The Alternative is to reject the 1AC and imagine Whatever Being--Any point of rejection of the sovereign state creates a non-state world made up of whatever life – that involves imagining a political body that is outside the sphere of sovereignty that defies traditional attempts to maintain a social identity

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(Anne, “Bio-Sovereignty and the Emergence of Humanity,” Theory & Event, Volume 7, Issue 2, Project Muse)

Can we imagine another form of humanity, and another form of power? The bio-sovereignty described by Agamben is so fluid as to appear irresistible. Yet Agamben never suggests this order is necessary. Bio-sovereignty results from a particular and contingent history, and it requires certain conditions. Sovereign power, as Agamben describes it, finds its grounds in specific coordinates of life, which it then places in a relation of indeterminacy. What defies sovereign power is a life that cannot be reduced to those determinations: a life "that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked life. " (2.3). In his earlier Coming Community, Agamben describes this alternative life as "whatever being." More recently he has used the term "forms-of-life." These concepts come from the figure Benjamin proposed as a counter to homo sacer: the "total condition that is 'man'." For Benjamin and Agamben, mere life is the life which unites law and life. That tie permits law, in its endless cycle of violence, to reduce life an instrument of its own power. The total condition that is man refers to an alternative life incapable of serving as the ground of law. Such a life would exist outside sovereignty. Agamben's own concept of whatever being is extraordinarily dense. It is made up of varied concepts, including language and potentiality; it is also shaped by several particular dense thinkers, including Benjamin and Heidegger. What follows is only a brief consideration of whatever being, in its relation to sovereign power. / "Whatever being," as described by Agamben, lacks the features permitting the sovereign capture and regulation of life in our tradition. Sovereignty's capture of life has been conditional upon the separation of natural and political life. That separation has permitted the emergence of a sovereign power grounded in this distinction, and empowered to decide on the value, and non-value of life (1998: 142). Since then, every further politicization of life, in turn, calls for "a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only 'sacred life,' and can as such be eliminated without punishment" (p. 139). / This expansion of the range of life meriting protection does not limit sovereignty, but provides sites for its expansion. In recent decades, factors that once might have been indifferent to sovereignty become a field for its exercise. Attributes such as national status, economic status, color, race, sex, religion, geo-political position have become the subjects of rights declarations. From a liberal or cosmopolitan perspective, such enumerations expand the range of life protected from and serving as a limit upon sovereignty. Agamben's analysis suggests the contrary. If indeed sovereignty is bio-political before it is juridical, then juridical rights come into being only where life is incorporated within the field of bio-sovereignty. The language of rights, in other words, calls up and depends upon the life caught within sovereignty: homo sacer. / Agamben's alternative is therefore radical. He does not contest particular aspects of the tradition. He does not suggest we expand the range of rights available to life. He does not call us to deconstruct a tradition whose power lies in its indeterminate status.21 Instead, he suggests we take leave of the tradition and all its terms. Whatever being is a life that defies the classifications of the tradition, and its reduction of all forms of life to homo sacer. Whatever being therefore has no common ground, no presuppositions, and no particular attributes. It cannot be broken into discrete parts; it has no essence to be separated from its attributes; and it has no common substrate of existence defining its relation to others. Whatever being cannot then be broken down into some common element of life to which additive series of rights would then be attached. Whatever being retains all its properties, without any of them constituting a different valuation of life (1993: 18.9). As a result, whatever being is "reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims) -- and it is reclaimed not for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-such, for belonging itself." (0.1-1.2). / Indifferent to any distinction between a ground and added determinations of its essence, whatever being cannot be grasped by a power built upon the separation of a common natural life, and its political specification. Whatever being dissolves the material ground of the sovereign exception and cancels its terms. This form of life is less post-metaphysical or anti-sovereign, than a-metaphysical and a-sovereign. Whatever is indifferent not because its status does not matter, but because it has no particular attribute which gives it more value than another whatever being. As Agamben suggests, whatever being is akin to Heidegger's Dasein. Dasein, as Heidegger describes it, is that life which always has its own being as its concern -- regardless of the way any other power might determine its status. Whatever being, in the manner of Dasein, takes the form of an "indissoluble cohesion in which it is impossible to isolate something like a bare life. In the state of exception become the rule, the life of homo sacer, which was the correlate of sovereign power, turns into existence over which power no longer seems to have any hold" (Agamben 1998: 153). / We should pay attention to this comparison. For what Agamben suggests is that whatever being is not any abstract, inaccessible life, perhaps promised to us in the future. Whatever being, should we care to see it, is all around us, wherever we reject the criteria sovereign power would use to classify and value life. "In the final instance the State can recognize any claim for identity -- even that of a State identity within the State . . . What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without a representable condition of belonging" (Agamben 1993:85.6). At every point where we refuse the distinctions sovereignty and the state would demand of us, the possibility of a non-state world, made up of whatever life, appears.

### Kaldor

#### The affirmatives political methodology for addressing conflict is founded in stereotypes of fear, producing inaccurate scholarship. Their methodology will inherently pit anyone who is not with us, against us.

Kaldor 13, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, “In Defence of New Wars,” March 7, 2013, Stability, 2(1): 4, pp. 1-16, <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/download/sta.at/40%E2%80%8E>

The most common criticism of the ‘new wars’ argument is that new wars are not new. It is argued that the Cold War clouded our ability to analyse ‘small wars’ or ‘low-intensity wars’, that many of the characteristics of new wars associated with weak states can be found in the early modern period and that phenomena like banditry, mass rape, forced population displacement, or atrocities against civilians all have a long history. Of course this is true. Many of the features of new wars can be found in earlier wars. Of course the dominance of the East-West conflict obscured other types of conflict. But there is an important reason, which is neglected by the preoccupation with empirical claims, for insisting on the adjective ‘new’. Critics of the ‘new wars’ thesis often concede that what is useful about the analysis of ‘new wars’ is the policy implication of the argument. But this is precisely the point. The term ‘new’ is a way to exclude ‘old’ assumptions about the nature of war and to provide the basis for a novel research methodology. The aim of describing the conflicts of the 1990’s as ‘new’ is to change the way scholars investigate these conflicts and thus to change the way policy-makers and policy- shapers perceive these conflicts. Dominant understandings of these conflicts that under pin policy are of two kinds. On the one hand, there is a tendency to impose a stereotyped version of war, drawn from the experience of the last two centuries in Europe, in which war consists of a conflict between two warring parties, generally states or proto-states with legitimate interests, what I call ‘Old Wars’. This term refers to a stylised form of war rather than to all earlier wars. In such wars, the solution is either negotiation or victory by one side and outside intervention takes the form of either traditional peace, keeping in which the peace-keepers are supposed to guarantee a negotiated agreement and the ruling principles are consent, neutrality and impartiality - or traditional war-fighting on one side or the other, as in Korea or the Gulf War. On the other hand, where policy-makers recognise the short comings of the stereotypical understanding, there is a tendency to treat these wars as anarchy, barbarism, ancient rivalries, where the best policy response is containment, i.e. protecting the borders of the West from this malady. The use of the term ‘new’ is a way of demonstrating that neither of these approaches are appropriate, that these are wars with their own logic but a logic that is different from ‘old wars’ and which therefore dictates a very different research strategy and a different policy response. In other words, the ‘new wars’ thesis is both about the changing character of organised violence and about developing a way of understanding, interpreting and explaining the interrelated characteristics of such violence. As Jacob Mundy (2011) puts it, in one of the more thoughtful contributions to the debate: ‘Whether we choose to reject, embrace or reformulate concepts such as.... new wars, our justifications should not be based on claims of alleged coherence with particular representations of history Rather such concepts should be judged in terms of their ability to address the very phenomena they seek to ameliorate’. Even so, it can be argued that there are some genuinely new elements of contemporary conflicts. Indeed, it would be odd if there were not. The main new elements have to do with globalisation and technology. First of all, the increase in the destructiveness and accuracy of all forms of military technology has made symmetrical war, war between similarly armed opponents, increasingly destructive and therefore difficult to win. The first Gulf war between Iraq and Iran was perhaps the most recent example of symmetrical war a war, much like the First World War, that lasted for years and killed millions of young men, for almost no political result. Hence, tactics in the new wars necessarily have to deal with this reality. Secondly, new forms of communications (information technology, television and radio, cheap air travel) have had a range of implications. Even though most contemporary conflicts are very local, global connections are much more extensive, including criminal networks, Diaspora links, as well as the presence of international agencies, NGOS, and journalists. The ability to mobilise around both exclusivist causes and human rights causes has been speeded up by new communications. Communications are also increasingly a tool of war, making it easier, for example, to spread fear and panic than in earlier periods hence, spectacular acts of terrorism. This does not mean, as Berdal (2011) suggests, that the argument implies that all contemporary wars involve global connections or that those connections are necessarily regressive. Rather, it is an element in theorising the logic of new wars. Thirdly, even though it may be the case that, as globalisation theorists argue, globalisation has not led to the demise of the state but rather its transformation, it is important to delineate the different ways in which states are changing. Perhaps the most important aspect of state transformation is the changing role of the state in relation to organised violence. On the one hand, the monopoly of violence is eroded from above, as some states are increasingly embedded in a set of international rules and institutions. On the other hand, the monopoly of violence is eroded from below as other states become weaker under the impact of globalisation. There is, it can be argued, a big difference between the sort of privatised wars that characterised the pre-modern period and the ‘new wars’ which come after the modern period and are about disintegration. These new elements are not the reason for the adjective ‘new’, however, even though they may help to explain the evolution of new wars. The point of the adjective ‘new’ does not have to do with any particular feature of contemporary conflicts nor how well it resembles our assumptions about reality, but rather it has to do with the model of war and how the model I spell out is different from the prevailing models that underpin both policy and scholarship. It is a model that entails a specific political, economic and military logic.

#### Recreation of these stereotypes entrenches the existing power structure ensuring globalized war and structural violence

Kaldor 99, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance a the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, New & Old Wars, 1999, Stanford University Press, pg 110-111

The new wars have political goals. The aim is political mobilization on the basis of identity. The military strategy for achieving this aim is population displacement and destabilization so as to get rid of those whose identity is different and to foment hatred and fear. Nevertheless, this divisive and exclusive form of politics cannot be disentangled from its economic basis. The various political/military factions plunder the assets of ordinary people as well as the remnants of the state and cream off external assist ance destined for the victims, in a way that is only possible in conditions of war or near war. In other words, war provides a legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions of power and for access to resources. While this predatory set of social relationships is most prevalent in the war zones, it aLso characterizes the surrounding regions. Because participation in the war is relatively low (in Bosnia, only 6.5 per cent of the population took part directly in the pros ecution of the war) the difference between zones of war and apparent zones of peace are not nearly as marked as in earlier periods. Just as it is difficult to distinguish between the political and the economic, public and private, military and civil, so it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between war and peace. The new war economy could be represented as a continuum, starting with the combination of criminality and racism to be found in the inner cities of Europe and North America and reaching its most acute manifestation in the areas where the scale of violence is greatest. If violence and predation are to be found in what are considered zones of peace, so it is possible to find islands of civility in nearly all the war zones. They are much less known about than the war zones, because it is violence and criminalitý and not normality that is generally reported. But there are regions where local state apparatuses continue to function, where taxes arc raised, services are provided and some production is maintained. There are groups who defend humanistic values and refuse the politics of particularism. The town of Tuzia in Bosnia— Herzegovina represents one celebrated example. The self-defence units created in Southern Rwanda arc another example. In isolation, these islands of civility are difficult to preserve, squeezed by the polarization of violence, but the very fragmentary and decentralized character of the new type of warfare makes such examples possible. Precisely because the new wars are a social condition that arises as the formal political economy withers, they are very difficult to end. Diplomatic negotiations from above fail to take into account the underlying social relations; they treat the various factions as though they were protostates. Temporary ceaselires or truces may merely legitimize new agreements or partnerships that, for the moment, suit the various factions. Peacekeeping troops sent in to monitor ceasefires which reflect the status quo may help to maintain a division of territory and to prevent the return of refugees. Economic reconstruction channelled through existing ‘political authorities’ may merely provide new sources of revenue as local assets dry up. As long as the power relations remain the same, sooner or later the violence will start again. Fear, hatred and predation are riot recipes for long-term viable polities. Indeed, this type of war economy is perennially on the edge of exhaustion. This does not mean, however, that they will disappear of their own accord. There has to be some alternative. In the next chapter, I will consider the possibilities for such an alternative; in particular, how islands of civility might offer a counterlogic to the new warfare.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC and their outdated conceptions of sovereignty and war to interrupt the cycle of acting so that we may alter our scholarship and military logic to embrace a reformist cosmopolitan ethic.

Kaldor 05, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, “Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror,” International Politics, 42.4, December 2005, pg 497-498

By analysing New War in terms of social relations of warfare, we come up with a very different approach about how to deal with these type of conflicts and indeed, how to deal with terrorism in general. I don't want to suggest that terrorism is not a serious threat. On the contrary, I think it is too serious to be hijacked by fantasies of Old War. Actually, I felt the same way about Communism; nuclear weapons, in my view, prevented us from adopting a serious strategy for undermining communism; this was only possible in a détente context. I think World War II really did mark the end of Old Wars. Wars of this type are impossible; they are simply too destructive to be fought and have become unacceptable and, indeed, illegitimate. The 8-year war between Iraq and Iran was probably the exception that proved the rule. It was immensely destructive and led to a military stalemate and, at least on the Iraqi side, far from consolidating the state, it was the beginning of state disintegration, the slide into new war.New Wars deliberately violate all the conventions of Old War, as well as the new body of human rights legislation that has been built up since World War II. The key to dealing with New Wars has to be the reconstruction of political legitimacy. If Old Wars established a notion of political legitimacy in terms of the friend-enemy distinction, in New Wars the friend-enemy distinction destroys political legitimacy. So, political legitimacy can only be reconstructed on the basis of popular consent and within a framework of international law. It means supporting efforts of democratization in difficult situations or using various international tools and law to support such processes.Is there a role for military force? Yes, I believe military force has to be used to protect people and uphold the rule of law. I favour humanitarian intervention in cases of threatened humanitarian catastrophes. But that can't be done through classic war fighting. I don't have time to discuss this, but I do think that one can envisage new defensive uses of forces aimed at prevention, protection and stabilization rather than victory.Carl Schmitt would argue that there can be no political community without enemies, and that, where force is used in the name of humanity, the adversary is no longer an enemy but an outlaw, a disturber of the peace. If he is right, the future is very grim, a pervasive global New War is possible. But if we believe political communities can be held together by reason rather than fear, then there is an alternative possibility, a transformation of statehood, in which states are no longer intrinsically linked to warfare and operate within a multilateral framework. And as for the argument about humanity, we could turn it on its head. If we dub the terrorists as enemies, we give them political status; indeed, this may be what they are trying to achieve. I think it is quite a good idea to see them as outlaws and disturbers of the peace, and to use the methods of policing and intelligence rather than Old War.To conclude, what I have tried to show is that attempts to recreate Old War prevent us from dealing with the realities of today's globalized world. Indeed ideas of Old War feed into and exacerbate real New Wars taking place in Iraq and elsewhere. I call them 'new' not because they are altogether new but because we can only develop alternative strategies if we see how different they are from World War II, the Cold War or the War on Terror. I think there is a huge security gap in the world today. Millions of people live in daily fear of violence. Yet, our conceptions of security, drawn from the dominant experience of World War II, does not reduce that insecurity. Indeed, it makes it worse.

### I-Law Advantage

#### No impact – Williams is 3 years old and 2012 cyber attacks should’ve triggered – that’s CX.

#### No risk of China conflict – cyber attacks won’t escalate.

Moss 4/19/13 (Trefor, Independent Journalist for the Diplomat, "Is Cyber war the New Cold War")

Cyberspace is anarchic, and incidents there span a hazy spectrum from acts of protest and criminality all the way to invasions of state sovereignty and deliberate acts of destruction. Cyber attacks that might be considered acts of war have so far been rare. It is certainly hard to characterise the rivalry between China and the U.S. as it stands as cyber warfare, argues Adam Segal, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “I tend to stay away from the term ‘cyber war’ since we have seen no physical destruction and no deaths,” he explains. Segal accepts that there is a conflict of sorts between China and the U.S. in cyberspace, though he says it is “likely to remain below a threshold that would provoke military conflict.”. While there is no internationally accepted categorization of different kinds of cyber activity (individual states have varying definitions), it is self-evident that some episodes are more serious than others. NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) – a unit based, not by accident, in Estonia, which experienced a massive cyber-attack [from Russia](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm) in 2007 – distinguishes between “cyber crime,”“cyber espionage,” and “cyber warfare.”¶ China’s cyber operations, for all their notoriety, have essentially been acts of theft – either criminals attempting to extract privileged data, or incidents of state-sponsored espionage (some of which, admittedly, had national security implications, such as the [extraction of blueprints](http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/security-experts-admit-china-stole-secret-fighter-jet-plans/story-fnb64oi6-1226296400154) for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter). But these operations did not seek to cause any physical destruction, and so would be hard to interpret as acts of war. This may explain why the U.S. government has been quite tolerant of Chinese hacking until now, seeing it as an irritant rather than as anything more provocative.

#### No risk of China offensive cyber operation - globalization means it not in their self-interest

Chou 2/8/11 (Ella, Graduate Student in Regional Studies at Harvard Law, "US-China Cyber War Scenario in the Eyes of a Chinese Student" The Atlantic)

In this equation, intent ranges from zero to 100% (100% meaning the country is willing to devote all capability to one mission). Even if China's capability in the cyber arena is increasing, it does not make it a threat to U.S. national security if China does not have the intent to use that capability in an attack against the United States. It would hardly be surprising to learn that China, like all countries with such capabilities, is engaged in cyber espionage. But real or threatened attacks against either U.S. military or the civilian infrastructure would not be in China's interests for a variety of reasons: the negative effects on trade which would have a direct impact on its volatile migrant labor population, the international backlash that would destroy its hard-earned position in the international organizations in which it has strong interests, not to mention the danger of confronting the full weight of U.S. military.

#### ---Congressional oversight is strong now – numerous congressional hearings prove

Inside Cyber Security 7/22/13 ("Congress Shifts Into Cyber Security Oversight Despite Unresolved Liability Questions")

In the absence of legislation, lawmakers are advancing their cybersecurity priorities and concerns through the oversight process. Meehan pressed witnesses from DHS and NIST on issues such as whether the voluntary framework is a first step toward formal regulation of industry, and whether the framework creates an assumption of liability for companies that decline to participate.¶ Robert Kolasky, who heads the DHS integrated task force on cybersecurity, and Charles Romine, director of NIST's information technology lab, represented the administration before the panel.¶ "I can speak with certainty that [DHS] looks at this as a voluntary program," Kolasky told Meehan. Romine said he didn't believe the process would lead to federal regulation, and said the "vigorous participation" by the private sector in developing the framework demonstrated its voluntary nature. "The only way it works is with buy-in," Romine said.¶ Subcommittee ranking member Yvette Clarke (D-NY) stressed her concerns that data privacy be protected throughout the process, and that federal civil liberties and privacy officials have a place at the table as the framework is developed and implemented.¶ Romine and Kolasky both said privacy protections were being "baked into the process," although officials acknowledged at a NIST workshop earlier this month in San Diego that more needs to be done to create metrics on privacy.¶ While the Homeland Security subcommittee hearing was largely a collegial affair, it didn't entirely escape the heat generated by the NSA leaks and other controversies.¶ "This administration has had a series of bungles," Rep. Tom Marino (R-PA) charged. "And usually a low-level person gets blamed." He demanded to know how accountability would be assessed within the administration's cyber program, saying "insider threats are happening ad nauseam in this administration."¶ Romine said "risk mitigation of insider threats" was an ongoing process. Kolasky mentioned three steps to ensure security: separating classified from unclassified information and getting the latter out as quickly as possible; security improvements to the Cybersecurity Service Program; and ensuring proper vetting of employees with access to the data.

#### Soft power ineffective – Alt causes will always come before the plan—world focuses on failures not success

**Rachman 9** [Gideon Rachman is the Economist's bureau chief in Brussels, June 1 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e608b556-4ee0-11de-8c10-00144feabdc0.html]

Barack Obama is a soft power president. But the world keeps asking him hard power questions. From North Korea to Guantánamo Bay, from Iran to Afghanistan, Mr Obama is confronting a range of vexing **issues** that **cannot be charmed** **out of existence.** The problem is epitomised by the US president’s trip to the Middle East this week. Its focal point will be a much-trailed speech in Cairo on Thursday June 4, in which he will directly address the Muslim world. The Cairo speech is central to Mr Obama’s efforts to rebuild America’s global popularity and its ability to persuade – otherwise known as soft power. The president has been trying out potential themes for the speech on aides and advisers for months. He is likely to emphasise his respect for Islamic culture and history, and his personal links to the Muslim world. He will suggest to his audience that both the US and the Islamic world have, at times, misjudged and mistreated each other – and he will appeal for a new beginning. George W. Bush launched a military offensive in the Middle East. Mr Obama is launching a charm offensive. There is plenty to be said for this approach. Mr Bush embroiled America in a bloody war in Iraq that strengthened Iran and acted as a recruiting sergeant for America’s enemies. Mr Obama’s alternative strategy is based on diplomacy, engagement and empathy. Mr Bush had a shoe thrown at him in his last appearance in the Middle East. So if Mr Obama receives his customary standing ovation in Cairo, that will send a powerful symbolic message. But the president should not let the applause go to his head. Even if his speech is a success, the same foreign-policy problems will be sitting in his in-tray when he gets back to the Oval Office – and they will be just as dangerous as before. In particular, there is chatter in official Washington that the Israelis may be gearing up to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities before the end of the year. The Obama administration is against any such move and it is normally assumed that Israel would not dare to pull the trigger without the go-ahead from Washington – not least because the Israelis would have to fly across US-controlled airspace to get to their targets. But the Americans do not have a complete veto over Israel’s actions. One senior US official asks rhetorically: “What are we going to do? Shoot down their planes?” A conflict between Israel and Iran would scatter the Obama administration’s carefully laid plans for Middle East peace to the winds. It would also make talk of improving American soft power around the world seem beside the point. The immediate task would be to prevent a wider regional war. In the meantime, the US will press on with the effort to achieve peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. But even that goal is **unlikely** to be advanced much by Mr Obama’s trip to the Middle East. Many in the audience in Cairo and in the wider Islamic world will want and even expect the new president to lay out a complete vision for a peace settlement and to apply unambiguous pressure on Israel. For reasons of domestic politics, diplomacy and timing, Mr Obama is highly unlikely to do this. Yet while his Arab audience may be disappointed by what he has to say about the Middle East peace process, Mr Obama is already facing an increasingly tense relationship with the new Israeli government. The administration has now clashed openly with the Israelis over the Netanyahu government’s tolerance of expanded settlements in occupied Palestinian land. Mr Obama is also running up against the limits of soft power elsewhere. Closing the prison camp at Guantánamo was meant to be the ultimate tribute to soft power over hard power. The Obama team argued consistently that the damage that Guantánamo did to America’s image in the world outweighed any security gains from holding al-Qaeda prisoners there. Yet, faced with the backlash against releasing the remaining 240 prisoners or imprisoning them in the US, the Obama administration has **back-tracked**. It is not clear whether Guantánamo will be closed on schedule or what will happen to the riskier-sounding prisoners, who may still be held indefinitely. The much-criticised military trials are likely to be revived. In Afghanistan, Mr Obama is trying a mixture of hard and soft power. There will be a military surge – but also a “civilian surge”, designed to build up civil society and governance in Afghanistan. Old hands in Washington are beginning to shake their heads and mutter about Vietnam. Mr Obama’s preferred tools of diplomacy, **engagement and charm do not seem to be of much use with Kim Jong-il of North Korea**, either. The North Koreans have just tested a nuclear weapon – leaving the Obama administration scratching its head about what to do. The president’s charisma and rhetorical skill are real diplomatic assets. If Mr Obama can deploy them to improve America’s image and influence around the world, that is all to the good. There is nothing wrong with trying to re-build American “soft power”. The danger is more subtle. It is that President Yes-we-can has raised exaggerated hopes about the pay-off from engagement and diplomacy. In the coming months it will become increasingly obvious that soft power also **has** its **limits**.

#### We’ll adapt to warming.

Mendelsohn ‘9 – Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: <http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf>

These statements arelargely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences**.** The science and economicsof climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to onlymild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these **“**potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

**Higher C02 levels are key to preventing the next ice age**

**Watts 12**, Increased C02 emissions will delay next ice age, January 8 [Meteorologist, Anthony], p . [http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/01/08/increased – co2 – emissions – will – delay – next – ice – age/](http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/01/08/increased-co2-emissions-will-delay-next-ice-age/)

According to new research to be published in Nature Geoscience (embargoed until 1800 GMT/10AM PST, Sunday 8 January 2012), the next ice age could set in any time this millennium were it not for increases in anthropogenic CO2 emissions that are preventing such a global disaster from occurring. The new research confirms the theory developed by the late Sir Fred Hoyle and Professor Chandra Wickramasinghe in the 1990s that without increased levels of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere ‘the drift into new ice – age conditions would be inevitable.’

**The alternative is global extinction**

**Whitehouse 12**, The Observatory, Will the Ice Return?, January 11, [scientist with a Ph.D., in Astrophysics, Victoria University of Manchester and former Science correspondent for the BBC; David], p. [http://thegwpf.org/the – observatory/4736 – will – the – ice – return.html](http://thegwpf.org/the-observatory/4736-will-the-ice-return.html)

Without doubt, we live in an interglacial period – a warm time between ice ages. There have been many during the current great glaciation. Some have these periods have been warmer than today, many shorter than our current interglacial's duration. The return of the ice would, short of a giant meteor strike, be the biggest disaster to face humanity. Vast swathes of the northern Hemisphere would be frozen. Northern Europe, Asia, Canada and the United States would have extensive regions rendered uninhabitable. Mankind would have to move south. There would be no choice as no technology could stop the ice or allow our high populations to life amongst it. Some believe the return of the ice will not happen for thousands of years, other that the signs could be visible within decades. But could it be that the greenhouse gasses being pumped into the atmosphere, that many believe are responsible for a recent warming of the planet, might counteract the forces bringing us a new glaciation? Could it be that greenhouse gasses might actually stave off the return of the ice and save the lives of tens of millions, if not civilisation itself? A recent study by scientists at Cambridge University and published in the Journal Nature Geoscience suggests that the carbon dioxide might extend the current interglacial until carbon dioxide levels fall. They believe that the atmospheric concentration of CO2 must be about 240 parts per million before glaciation could start. Currently, it is about 390 ppm. In a 1999 essay, Sir Fred Hoyle said: "The renewal of ice – age conditions would render a large fraction of the world's major food – growing areas inoperable and so would inevitably lead to the extinction of most of the present human population. We must look to a sustained greenhouse effect to maintain the present advantageous world climate.

#### Empirically fails to address specific flashpoints

**Greenwald ’10** (Abe is policy adviser and online editor with the Foreign Policy Initiative in Washington, July/August http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/the-soft-power-fallacy-15466?page=all

Like Francis Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History,” soft-power theory was a creative and appealing attempt to make sense of America’s global purpose. Unlike Fukuyama’s theory, however, which the new global order seemed to support for nearly a decade, Nye’s was basically refuted by world events in its very first year. In the summer of 1990, a massive contingent of Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait and effectively annexed it as a province of Iraq. Although months earlier Nye had asserted that “geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important,” the fact is that Saddam invaded Kuwait because of its geographic proximity, insubstantial military, and plentiful oil reserves. Despite Nye’s claim that “the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force,” months of concerted international pressure, including the passage of a UN resolution, failed to persuade Saddam to withdraw. In the end, only overwhelming American military power succeeded in liberating Kuwait. The American show of force also succeeded in establishing the U.S. as the single, unrivaled post–Cold War superpower. Following the First Gulf War, the 1990s saw brutal acts of aggression in the Balkans: the Bosnian War in 1992 and the Kosovo conflicts beginning in 1998. These raged on despite international negotiations and were quelled only after America took the lead in military actions. It is also worth noting that attempts to internationalize these efforts made them more costly in time, effectiveness, and manpower than if the U.S. had acted unilaterally. Additionally, the 1990s left little mystery as to how cataclysmic events unfold when the U.S. declines to apply traditional tools of power overseas. In April 1994, Hutu rebels began the indiscriminate killing of Tutsis in Rwanda. As the violence escalated, the United Nations’s peacekeeping forces stood down so as not to violate a UN mandate prohibiting intervention in a country’s internal politics. Washington followed suit, refusing even to consider deploying forces to East-Central Africa. By the time the killing was done, in July of the same year, Hutus had slaughtered between half a million and 1 million Tutsis. And in the 1990s, Japan’s economy went into its long stall, making the Japanese model of a scaled down military seem rather less relevant. All this is to say that during the presidency of Bill Clinton, Nye’s “intangible forms of power” proved to hold little sway in matters of statecraft, while modes of traditional power remained as critical as ever in coercing other nations and affirming America’s role as chief protector of the global order.

### Turf War Advantage

#### No great power draw-in

**Gelb ’10** (President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, 2010 (Leslie, former senior official in the U.S. Defense Department and State Department, Foreign Affairs, November/December Foreign Affairs 2010)

Also reducing the likelihood of conflict today is that there is **no arena** in which the vital interests of great powers seriously clash. Indeed, the most worrisome security threats today--rogue states with nuclear weapons and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction--**actually tend to unite the great powers more than divide them**. In the past, and specifically during the first era of globalization, major powers would war over practically nothing. Back then, they fought over the Balkans, a region devoid of resources and geographic importance, a strategic zero. **Today, they are unlikely to shoulder their arms over almost anything, even the highly strategic Middle East. All have much more to lose than to gain from turmoil in that region**. To be sure, great **powers such as China and Russia will tussle with one another for advantages, but they will stop well short of direct confrontation.** **To an unprecedented degree**, the **major powers now need one another to grow their economies, and they are loath to jeopardize this interdependence by allowing traditional military and strategic competitions to escalate into wars**. In the past, U.S. enemies--such as the Soviet Union--would have rejoiced at the United States' losing a war in Afghanistan. Today, the United States and its enemies share an interest in blocking the spread of both Taliban extremism and the Afghan-based drug trade. China also looks to U.S. arms to protect its investments in Afghanistan, such as large natural-resource mines. More broadly, no great nation is challenging the balance of power in either Europe or Asia. Although nations may not help one another, they rarely oppose one another in explosive situations.

#### Grid is resilient and sustainable

**Clark ’12** (MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’12

(Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred – trees shorted a power line and caused a fault – that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis 2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars, brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other catastrophic events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American¶ history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the¶ fragility of the U.S. energy grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context of the robustness of the electrical grid. When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was unlikely to succeed because of the “huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult” (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the U.S. grid fails frequently. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always present. Power outages that affect more than 50,000 people have occurred steadily over the last 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev 2009). The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010). Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, the economy is affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like that caused by Hurricane Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis 2010). Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security challenge” (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

#### Backup capacity solves blackouts

Aimone ’12 (9-12 (Dr. Michael, Director of Business Enterprise Integration – Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), “Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies,” 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf)

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk. 1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has standby generators in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the generators are primed and ready to work, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

#### Econ resilient, US isn’t key, and impact empirically denied

**Lamy ’11**(Pascal Lamy is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. Lamy is Honorary President of Paris-based think tank Notre Europe. Lamy graduated from the prestigious Sciences Po Paris, from HEC and ÉNA, graduating second in his year of those specializing in economics. “System Upgrade” BY PASCAL LAMY | APRIL 18, 2011)

**The** bigger **test came with** the 2008-2009 Great Recession, **the first** truly **global recession** since World War II. When the international economy went into free fall, trade went right along with it. Production and supply are today thoroughly global in nature, with most manufactured products made from parts and materials imported from many other countries. These global value chains have a multiplier effect on trade statistics, which explains why, as the global economy contracted by 2 percent in 2009, trade volume shrank by more than 12 percent. This multiplier effect works the other way around as well: **Growth returned** to 4.6 percent and trade volume grew by a record 14.5 percent over the course of 2010. **Projections for trade** in 2011 **are** also **strong**, with WTO economists predicting that trade volume will rise 6.5 percent during the current year. This sharp rebound in trade has proved two essential things: **Markets stayed open despite ever-stronger pressures** to close them, and trade is an indispensible tool for economic recovery, particularly for developing countries, which are more dependent on trade. Shortly after the crisis broke out, we in the WTO began to closely monitor the trade policy response of our member governments. Many were fearful that pressures to impose trade restrictions would prove too powerful for governments to resist. But this is not what happened. Instead, **the system of rules and disciplines**, agreed to over 60 years of negotiations, **held firm**. In **a series of reports** prepared for WTO members and the G-20, we found that **governments acted with great restraint**. At no time did the trade-restrictive measures imposed cover more than 2 percent of world imports. Moreover, the measures used -- anti-dumping duties, safeguards, and countervailing duties to offset export or production subsidies -- were those which, in the right circumstances, are permissible under WTO rules. I am not suggesting that every safeguard measure or countervailing duty imposed during those difficult days was in compliance with WTO rules, but responses to trade pressures were generally undertaken within an internationally agreed-upon framework. Countries by and large resisted overtly noncompliant measures, such as breaking legally binding tariff ceilings or imposing import bans or quotas. As **markets stayed open, trade flows began to shift**, **and countries** that shrugged off the impact of the crisis and **continued to grow** -- **notably China, India, and Brazil** -- **became ever-more attractive markets for countries that were struggling**, **including** those in Europe and **North America**. Trade has been a powerful engine for growth in the developing world, a fact reflected in the far greater trade-to-GDP ratios we see there. In 2010, developing countries' share of world trade expanded to a record 45 percent, and this trend looks set to continue. Decisions made in Brasilia, Beijing, and New Delhi to open their respective economies to trade have been instrumental in enabling these countries to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

#### Best study proves no conflict from econ decline

**Brandt and Ulfelder ‘11** (\*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. \*\*Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict, April, 2011, “Economic Growth and Political Instability,” Social Science Research Network)

These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown. Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly affect their political stability **has not been subjected to** a great deal of careful **empirical analysis, and evidence from social science research** to date **does not** unambiguously **support it.** Theoretical models of civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have **hardly** been **studied in recent years**, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression. This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, **ours is the first statistical study** of this relationship to simultaneously address the possibility of **nonlinearity and** problems of **endogeneity**. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general **evaluation** of this argument **to date**. As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability is **neither as uniform nor as strong as** the **conventional wisdom**(s) **presume**(s). We think **these findings** also help **explain why the** global **recession** of 2008–2010 **has failed** thus far to **produce** the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social **unrest** associated with the crisis.

### Solvency

#### Oversight coming now – their Romm evidence says pressures from congress coming now – no warrant why this wouldn’t lead to the plan.

#### Their legal approach normalizes the state of exception – creating a legal framework for the deployment of offensive cyberoperations, the affirmative legitimizes their ‘legal’ military use

Gregory 11. Derek Gregory, professor of geography at the University of British Columbia, “The Everywhere War,” he Geographical Journal, Vol. 177, No. 3, September 2011, pg. 246

The question is a good one, but it needs to be directed outwards as well as inwards. For the United States is also developing an offensive capacity in cyberspace, and the mission of CYBERCOM includes the requirement ‘to prepare to, and when directed conduct, full-spectrum military cyberspace opera- tions in order to enable actions in all domains’. This is a programmatic statement, and there are difficult con- ceptual, technical and operational issues to be resolved. The concept of the ‘cyber kill-chain’ has already made its appearance: software engineers at Lockheed Martin have identified seven phases or ‘border-crossings’ in cyberspace through which all advanced persistent intrusions must pass so that, con- versely, blocking an attack at any one of them (dislo- cating any link in the kill-chain) makes it possible ‘to turn asymmetric battle to the defender’s advantage’ (Croom 2011; Holcomb and Shrewsbury 2011). The issues involved are also ethical and legal. Debate has been joined about what constitutes an armed attack in cyberspace and how this might be legally codified (Dipert 2010; Nakashima 2010), and most of all about how to incorporate the protection of civilians into the conduct of cyber warfare. In the ‘borderless realm of cyberspace’ Hughes (2010, 536) notes that the boundary between military and civilian assets – and hence military and civilian targets – becomes blurred, which places still more pressure on the already stressed laws of armed conflict that impose a vital distinction between the two (Kelsey 2008). Pre- paring for offensive operations includes developing a pre-emptive precision-strike capacity, and this is – precisely – why Stuxnet is so suggestive and why Shakarian (2011) sees it as inaugurating ‘a revolution in military affairs in the virtual realm’. Far from ‘carpet bombing’ cyberspace, Gross (2011) describes Stuxnet as a ‘self-directed stealth drone’ that, like the Predator and the Reaper, is ‘the new face of twenty- first century warfare’. Cyber wars will be secret affairs, he predicts, waged by technicians ‘none of whom would ever have to look an enemy in the eye. For people whose lives are connected to the targets, the results could be as catastrophic as a bombing raid but would be even more disorienting. People would suffer, but [they] would never be certain whom to blame.’

Contrapuntal geographies

I have argued elsewhere that the American way of war has changed since 9/11, though not uniquely because of it (Gregory 2010), and there are crucial continuities as well as differences between the Bush and Obama administrations: ‘The man who many considered the peace candidate in the last election was transformed into the war president’ (Carter 2011, 4). This requires a careful telling, and I do not mean to reduce the three studies I have sketched here to a single interpretative narrative. Yet there are connections between them as well as contradictions, and I have indicated some of these en route. Others have noted them too. Pakistan’s President has remarked that the war in Afghanistan has grave consequences for his country ‘just as the Mexican drug war on US borders makes a difference to American society’, and one scholar has suggested that the United States draws legal authority to conduct military operations across the border from Afghanistan (including the killing of bin Laden, codenamed ‘Geronimo’) from its history of extra-territorial opera- tions against non-state actors in Mexico in the 1870s and 1880s (including the capture of the real Geronimo) (Margolies 2011). Whatever one makes of this, one of the most persistent threads connecting all three cases is the question of legality, which runs like a red ribbon throughout the prosecution of late modern war. On one side, commentators claim that new wars in the global South are ‘non-political’, intrinsically predatory criminal enterprises, that cartels are morphing into insurgencies, and that the origins of cyber warfare lie in the dark networks of cyber crime; on the other side, the United States places a premium on the rule and role of law in its new counterinsurgency doctrine, accentuates the involvement of legal advisers in targeting decisions by the USAF and the CIA, and even as it refuses to confirm its UAV strikes in Pakistan provides arguments for their legality.

The invocation of legality works to marginalise ethics and politics by making available a seemingly neutral, objective language: disagreement and debate then become purely technical issues that involve matters of opinion, certainly, but not values. The appeal to legality – and to the quasi-judicial process it invokes – thus helps to authorise a widespread and widening militarisation of our world. While I think it is both premature and excessive to see this as a transformation from governmentality to ‘militariality’ (Marzec 2009), I do believe that Foucault’s (2003) injunction – ‘Society must be defended’ – has been transformed into an unconditional imperative since 9/11 and that this involves an intensifying triangulation of the planet by legality, security and war. We might remember that biopolitics, one of the central projects of late modern war, requires a legal armature to authorise its interven- tions, and that necropolitics is not always outside the law. This triangulation has become such a common- place and provides such an established base-line for contemporary politics that I am reminded of an inter- view with Zizek soon after 9/11 – which for him marked the last war of the twentieth century – when he predicted that the ‘new wars’ of the twenty-first century would be distinguished by a radical uncertainty: ‘it will not even be clear whether it is a war or not’ (Deich- mann et al. 2002).

#### Citing international law doesn’t set a precedent

New York Times 8 (“US Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations,” 9-18, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html?_r=2&hp=&adxnnlx=1221753717-8pdanTsDalyAfCQgzjrVvQ&pagewanted=print>)

**Judicial citation** or discussion **of a foreign ruling does not**, moreover, **convert it into binding precedent.** Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting as a circuit court judge, discussed the question in 1811. “It has been said that the decisions of British courts, made since the Revolution, are not authority in this country,” he said. “I admit it — but they are entitled to that respect which is due to the opinions of wise men who have maturely studied the subject they decide.” Indeed, **American judges cite all sorts of things in their decisions — law review articles, song lyrics, television programs.** State supreme courts cite decisions from other states, though a decision from Wisconsin is no more binding in Oregon than is one from Italy. “**Foreign opinions are not authoritative; they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge**,” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said in a 2006 address to the Constitutional Court of South Africa. “But they can add to the story of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions.” But Professor Fried said the area was a minefield. “**Courts have been citing foreign law forever,** but sparingly, for very good reason,” he said. “It is an invitation to bolster conclusions reached on other grounds. It leads to more impressionistic, undisciplined adjudication.”

## 2NC

### \*\*\*Kaldor

### A2 Case Outweighs

#### First, that logic is exactly what we criticize. Their totalizing ontology of violence permeates being and replicates cycles of violence. Their acceptance hastens our willingness to go to war and eliminates our critical consciousness to question state violence.

Burke 07 (Anthony, senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence, and Reason,” Vol. 10, No. 2, Project Muse)

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being.

#### Second, prefer our impacts – They have card 0 that proves that their impacts are epistemologically justified ----- their internal link chains and impact claims have too many fundamental flaws related to ideological biases (and, they can’t defend empiricism/positivism because they can’t meet the standards to falsifiability)

Kaldor 99, (Mary, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, 2006 “New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era”, p69-70)

The political goals of the new wars are about the claim to power on the basis of seemingly traditional identities — nation, tribe, religion. Yet the upsurge in the politics of particularisticidentities cannot be understood in traditional terms. It has to be explained in the context of a growing cultural dissonance between those who participate in transnational networks which communicate through e-mail, faxes, telephone and air travel, and those who are excluded from global processes and are tied to localities even though their lives may be profoundly shapedby those same processes.It would be a mistake to assume that this cultural divide can be expressed in simple political terms, that those who supportparticularistic identity politics are reacting against the processesof globalization, while those who favour a more tolerant,multicultural universalistic approach are part of the new globalclass. On the contrary, among the globalists are to be founddiaspora nationalists and fundamentalists, ‘realists’ and neo-liberals who believe that compromises with nationalism offersthe best hope for stability0 as well as transnational criminal groupswho profit from the new wars. And while there are many amongthe territorially tied who are likely to cling to traditional identities, there are also courageous individuals and citizens’ groupswho refuse particularisms and exclusiveness.The point is rather that the processes known as globalization are breaking up the cultural and socio-economic divisions that defined the patterns of politics which characterized the modernperiod. The new type of warfare has to be understood in termsof this global dislocation. New forms of power struggle may takethe guise of traditional nationalism, tribalism or communalism, but they are, nevertheless, contemporary phenomena arising. From contemporary causes and displaying new characteristics. Moreover, they are paralleled by a growing global consciousness and sense of global responsibility among an array of governmentaland non-governmental institutions as well as individuals.In this chapter, O describe some of the key characteristics ofthe process known as globalization and how they give rise tonew forms of identity politics. In the last section, ¡ shall try tooutline the emerging political cleavage between the politics ofparticularistic identity and the politics of cosmopolitan or humanist values.

### Overview

#### Security threats are the mechanisms of globalization to dominate the local in the name of humanity.

Nayar 99 Copyright (c) 1999 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Fall, 1999 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599. “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity” Jayan Nayar (Ph. D from the University of Cambridge, Professor of International Development Law and Human Rights and the University of Warwick) cylab.info/u/JQ/texts/Nayar-\_Orders\_of\_Inhumanity.doc

"Security" is another bulwark of the "new world-order." This is not surprising, for "development" requires the creation of conditions that facilitate its implementation and that ensure the obedience, if not the subservience, of those to be "developed." Security, as a motive for ordering, has been a useful distraction for this purpose, as is demonstrated by its transformation from a precept of coexistence to a common cause of globalization. From its very conception, the current framework of international order, constructed through the United Nations Charter, had as its fundamental rationale the creation of conditions of security. Born out of the expressed aspirations of the Atlantic Charter n26 amid the early phases of the Second World War, the postwar UN Charter begins with words that were intended to resonate generations down the line: "We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. . . ." n27 [\*613] With these visions of an order freed from the madness of states in conflict, there was created a basis for collective responsibility in the preservation of peace--the collective security regime under the supervision of the Security Council, and particularly, its "Permanent Members," as stipulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. n28 Many further refinements to these high ideals have since been made as the post-UN Charter world-order evolves. With the end of formal colonialism, attention was transferred in the 1960s and 1970s to the perceived importance of elaborating on principles of non-aggression and non-intervention. The 1980s and 1990s have seen a reversal of enthusiasms, however, as interest is being increasingly expressed, especially within "Western" states, for a more "collective" undertaking of responsibility in matters of security. This includes the forwarding of arguments in favor of "humanitarian intervention" in cases of "internal" conflicts. n29 These trends in the changing outlook on "security" and its relationship to "sovereignty" have continued, and have recently resulted in the formation of a permanent International Criminal Court to bring to justice perpetrators of "genocide," "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity." n30 Ever so gradually, it seems, the "new world-order" is moving away from the statist pillars of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction to a globalist notion of collective rights and responsibilities. Yet, as the following two observations on the nature of the global "security" landscape demonstrate, the realities of ordering that have flowed from reiterations of the commitment to non-violence have failed to establish a legacy of security for the majority of the global population: The period since 1945 may be regarded as a long peace only in the restricted sense that there has been no war between major powers. In other respects, and for much of the world, it has been a period of frequent wars. . . . By one estimate, between 1945 and 1989 there were 138 wars, resulting in some 23 million deaths. . . . All 138 wars were fought in the Third World, and many were fuelled by weapons provided by the two major powers [the United States and the Soviet Union] or their allies. n31 The twentieth-century is a period of history which, in the words of anthropologist Marvin Harris, has seen "a war to end all wars followed by a war to make the world safe for [\*614] democracy, followed by a world full of military dictatorships." We were then promised a New World-order as the reward for agreeing to the Gulf War, as the end of the Cold War gave way to a seemingly endless series of intra-state wars which the international community is unwilling or unable to bring to order. n32 Once again, from the perspective of the ordered, the order of security has proved to be the ideological weapon for the systematic infliction of violence. It is not so much the order of security that is of interest here, but rather, the ordering which takes place in its guise. And with the passing of history, so has the legitimizing claim for the necessity of violent ordering for "security" purposes--fascism, colonialism, communism, capitalism (depending on the ideological orientation of the claimant), terrorism (particularly of the Islamic bent). There is always an enemy, sometimes internal, sometimes external, threatening the well-being of the people. The languages of nationalism and sovereignty, of peace and collective security, constructed to suit whichever threat happens to be in fashion, are passionately employed; the anarchy that is a Hobbesian state of nature is always the prophesied consequence of the lack of order that is impending. And the price that the "ordered" has to pay for all this "security" in the post-colonial, new world-order?: the freedom of those who order to be violent! From a "nationalist" standpoint, the rhetoric would insist that the security of the state is paramount, all else flowing from it. By this perspective, the state, that prize which was (re)gained from the colonial epoch, that jewel to be protected by the international order of "collective security," becomes the expression of the dignity of the "people," no questions asked. n33 From the anti-colonial struggle, from independence, the reasoning flows naturally, it seems, that the State is to be preserved from any challenge. The police, the military, and the secret service, purportedly given sight and hearing by the eyes and the ears of "the people," are the trophies of "independence." Overnight, the term "freedom fighter" is banished from the vocabulary of the state, the notion of the "terrorist" becomes its replacement. Overnight, the revolution is terminated, with "counter-revolution" becoming [\*615] the label for any attempt to challenge the new status quo. Overnight, supposedly, the basic structures for freedom from violence are achieved--the condition of "security" that must be preserved is attained. Of course, the post-colonial state could not construct this security alone. In the spirit of the new "co-operation," where security is a global concern, the contribution by the "international community," providing the basic instruments of and training for security, proves essential. n34 From this "internationalist," arguably now, global, perspective, this "freedom to be violent" is a selective freedom, however. In some cases--in Turkey, Mexico, Burma, and until recently, in Indonesia, for example--the preserve of the state to "secure" its jurisdictional space is maintained, even encouraged, if not supported. In others--Kosovo and Iraq, for example--this "freedom to be violent" is denounced with the force of righteousness that automatically flows from the labeling of actions as "genocide," "crimes against humanity," "ethnic cleansing," or "holocaust." Most other cases, however, remain largely outside of global vision--Angola, Sierra Leone, Tibet, and Liberia being examples--where the sensitivities of morality are little disturbed by the apparent inconsequentiality of the deaths, pain and fear, the insecurity, of those sectors of humanity. Why this discrepancy in the international community's moral judgment on violence and "insecurity"? It may be that no "development" stakes presently exist for the international community with regard to the fate of these nameless, faceless wretches; they are so deemed unworthy of a starring role in the real-life dramas of prime-time television. Media hype and its feeding of the fixation of the arm-chair audience who are the ratings-figures that inform the corporate media of "newsworthiness" notwithstanding, the reality of insecurity is that it is a localized experience. No amount of editorial juxtapositioning of "shots" of suffering is able to capture fear and pain. "Insecurity" is beyond "order;" it either exists as an experiential reality or it does not. And where it does exist, it exists as a result of relationships of violence. Issues of complicity here warrant little air-time. Less compelling are revelations that distant suffering is not often the result of depravities "out there," but rather, the outcome of "securities" enforced on [\*616] "our" behalf. In this respect, I wonder for whom projections of order are (re)articulated at timely intervals. Is it for the secure who need reassurance to dissuade the suspicions within their conscience, or for the insecure whose very bodies and minds are the material "subjects" and objects of the very real effects of the ordering that is violence?

#### The affirmatives faith in the legal system is misplaced. They posit a static form of legality that violently aims to order and control socio-economicly identified populations without accepting inherent difference.

Gordon 87, Robert Gordon, Professor of Law at Stanford, “Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law,” Florida State University Law Review, Vol 15 No 3. 1987, lexis

Now a central tenet of CLS work has been that the ordinary discourses of law -- debates over legislation, legal arguments, administrative and court decisions, lawyers' discussions with clients, legal commentary and scholarship, etc. -- all contribute to cementing this feeling, at once despairing and complacent, that things must be the way they are and that major changes could only make them worse. Legal discourse accomplishes this in many ways. First by endlessly repeating the claim that law and the other policy sciences have perfected a set of rational techniques and institutions that have come about as close as we are ever likely to get to solving the problem of domination in civil society. Put another way, legal discourse paints an idealized fantasy of order according to which legal rules and procedures have so structured relations among people that such relations may primarily be understood as instituted by their consent, their free and rational choices. Such coercion as apparently remains may be explained as the result of necessity -- either natural necessities (such as scarcity or the limited human capacity for altruism) or social necessities. For example, in a number of the prevailing discourses, the ordinary hierarchies of workplace domination and subordination are explained: (1) by reference to the contractual agreement of the parties and to their relative preferences for responsibility versus leisure, or risk taking versus security; (2) by the natural distribution of differential talents and skills (Larry Bird earns more as a basketball player because he is better); and (3) by the demands of efficiency in production, which are said to require extensive hierarchy for the purposes of supervision and monitoring, centralization of investment decisions, and so forth. There are always some residues of clearly unhappy [\*199] conditions -- undeserved deprivation, exploitation, suffering -- that cannot be explained in any of these ways. The discourses of law are perhaps most resourceful in dealing with these residues, treating them as, on the whole, readily reformable within the prevailing political options for adjusting the structures of ordinary practices -- one need merely fine tune the scheme of regulation, or deregulation, to correct them. But the prevailing discourse has its cynical and worldly side, and its tragic moments, to offset the general mood of complacency. In this mood it resignedly acknowledges that beyond the necessary minimum and the reformable residues of coercion and misery there is an irreducible, intractable remainder -- due to inherent limits on our capacity for achieving social knowledge, or for changing society through deliberate intervention, or for taking collective action against evil without suffering the greater evil of despotic power. These discourses of legal and technical rationality, of rights, consent, necessity, efficiency, and tragic limitation, are of course discourses of power -- not only for the obvious reasons that law's commands are backed by force and its operations can inflict enormous pain, but because to have access to these discourses, to be able to use them or pay others to use them on your behalf, is a large part of what it means to possess power. Further, they are discourses that -- although often partially constructed, or extracted as concessions, through the pressure of relatively less powerful groups struggling from below -- in habitual practice tend to express the interests and the perspectives of the powerful people who use them. The discourses have some of the power they do because some of their claims sound very plausible, though many do not. The claim, for example, that workers in health-destroying factories voluntarily "choose," in any practical sense of the term, the risks of the workplace in return for a wage premium, is probably not believed by anyone save those few expensively trained out of the capacity to recognize what is going on around them. In addition, both the plausible and implausible claims are backed up in the cases of law and of economics and the policy sciences by a quite formidable-seeming technocratic apparatus of rational justification -- suggesting that the miscellany of social practices we happen to have been born into in this historical moment is much more than a contingent miscellany. It has an order, even if sometimes an invisible one; it makes sense. The array of legal norms, institutions, procedures, and doctrines in force, can be rationally derived from the principles of regard for individual autonomy, utilitarian [\*200] efficiency or wealth creation, the functional needs of social order or economic prosperity, or the moral consensus and historical traditions of the community. There are several general points CLS people have wanted to assert against these discourses of power. First, the discourses have helped to structure our ordinary perceptions of reality so as to systematically exclude or repress alternative visions of social life, both as it is and as it might be. One of the aims of CLS methods is to try to dredge up and give content to these suppressed alternative visions. Second, the discourses fail even on their own terms to sustain the case for their relentlessly apologetic conclusions. Carefully understood, they could all just as well be invoked to support a politics of social transformation instead. n3 Generally speaking, the CLS claims under this heading are that the rationalizing criteria appealed to (of autonomy, functional utility, efficiency, history, etc.) are far too indeterminate to justify any conclusions about the inevitability or desirability of particular current practices; such claims, when unpacked, again and again turn out to rest on some illegitimate rhetorical move or dubious intermediate premise or empirical assumption. Further, the categories, abstractions, conventional rhetorics, reasoning modes and empirical statements of our ordinary discourses in any case so often misdescribe social experience as not to present any defensible pictures of the practices that they attempt to justify. Not to say of course that there could be such a thing as a single correct way of truthfully rendering social life as people live it, or that CLS writers could claim to have discovered it. But the commonplace legal discourses often produce such seriously distorted representations of social life that their categories regularly filter out complexity, variety, irrationality, unpredictability, disorder, cruelty, coercion, violence, suffering, solidarity and self-sacrifice. n4 [\*201] Summing up: The purpose of CLS as an intellectual enterprise is to try to thaw out, or at least to hammer some tiny dents on, the frozen mind sets induced by habitual exposure to legal practices -- by trying to show how normal legal discourses contribute to freezing, and to demonstrate how problematic these discourses are.

#### Vote neg on ethics – colonialism must be rejected in every instance, even if they claim to do good.

Shaikh 07, Nermeen Shaikh, senior fellow at Asia Source, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” 2007, Development 50, Palgrave-Journals

It would probably be incorrect to assume that the principal impulse behind the imperial conquests of the 18th and 19th centuries was charity. Having conquered large parts of Africa and Asia for reasons other than goodwill, however, countries like England and France eventually did evince more benevolent aspirations; the civilizing mission itself was an act of goodwill. As Anatol Lieven (2007) points out, even 'the most ghastly European colonial project of all, King Leopold of Belgium's conquest of the Congo, professed benevolent goals: Belgian propaganda was all about bringing progress, railways and peace, and of course, ending slavery'. Whether or not there was a general agreement about what exactly it meant to be civilized, it is likely that there was a unanimous belief that being civilized was better than being uncivilized—morally, of course, but also in terms of what would enable the most in human life and potential. But what did the teaching of this civility entail, and what were some of the consequences of changes brought about by this benevolent intervention? In the realm of education, the spread of reason and the hierarchies created between different ways of knowing had at least one (no doubt unintended) effect. As Thomas Macaulay (1935) wrote in his famous Minute on Indian Education, We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. This meant, minimally, that English (and other colonial languages elsewhere) became the language of instruction, explicitly creating a hierarchy between the vernacular languages and the colonial one. More than that, it meant instructing an elite class to learn and internalize the culture—in the most expansive sense of the term—of the colonizing country, the methodical acculturation of the local population through education. As Macaulay makes it clear, not only did the hierarchy exist at the level of language, it also affected 'taste, opinions, morals and intellect'—all essential ingredients of the civilizing process. Although, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points out, colonialism can always be interpreted as an 'enabling violation', it remains a violation: the systematic eradication of ways of thinking, speaking, and being. Pursuing this line of thought, Spivak has elsewhere drawn a parallel to a healthy child born of rape. The child is born, the English language disseminated (the enablement), and yet the rape, colonialism (the violation), remains reprehensible. And, like the child, its effects linger. The enablement cannot be advanced, therefore, as a justification of the violation. Even as vernacular languages, and all habits of mind and being associated with them, were denigrated or eradicated, some of the native population was taught a hegemonic—and foreign—language (English) (Spivak, 1999). Is it important to consider whether we will ever be able to hear—whether we should not hear—from the peoples whose languages and cultures were lost? The colonial legacy At the political and administrative levels, the governing structures colonial imperialists established in the colonies, many of which survive more or less intact, continue, in numerous cases, to have devastating consequences—even if largely unintended (though by no means always, given the venerable place of divide et impera in the arcana imperii). Mahmood Mamdani cites the banalization of political violence (between native and settler) in colonial Rwanda, together with the consolidation of ethnic identities in the wake of decolonization with the institution and maintenance of colonial forms of law and government. Belgian colonial administrators created extensive political and juridical distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi, whom they divided and named as two separate ethnic groups. These distinctions had concrete economic and legal implications: at the most basic level, ethnicity was marked on the identity cards the colonial authorities introduced and was used to distribute state resources. The violence of colonialism, Mamdani suggests, thus operated on two levels: on the one hand, there was the violence (determined by race) between the colonizer and the colonized; then, with the introduction of ethnic distinctions among the colonized population, with one group being designated indigenous (Hutu) and the other alien (Tutsi), the violence between native and settler was institutionalized within the colonized population itself. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, which Mamdani suggests was a 'metaphor for postcolonial political violence' (2001: 11; 2007), needs therefore to be understood as a natives' genocide—akin to and enabled by colonial violence against the native, and by the new institutionalized forms of ethnic differentiation among the colonized population introduced by the colonial state. It is not necessary to elaborate this point; for present purposes, it is sufficient to mark the significance (and persistence) of the colonial antecedents to contemporary political violence. The genocide in Rwanda need not exclusively have been the consequence of colonial identity formation, but does appear less opaque when presented in the historical context of colonial violence and administrative practices. Given the scale of the colonial intervention, good intentions should not become an excuse to overlook the unintended consequences. In this particular instance, rather than indulging fatuous theories about 'primordial' loyalties, the 'backwardness' of 'premodern' peoples, the African state as an aberration standing outside modernity, and so forth, it makes more sense to situate the Rwandan genocide within the logic of colonialism, which is of course not to advance reductive explanations but simply to historicize and contextualize contemporary events in the wake of such massive intervention. Comparable arguments have been made about the consolidation of Hindu and Muslim identities in colonial India, where the corresponding terms were 'native' Hindu and 'alien' Muslim (with particular focus on the nature and extent of the violence during the Partition) (Pandey, 1998), or the consolidation of Jewish and Arab identities in Palestine and the Mediterranean generally (Anidjar, 2003, 2007).

#### Globalization and collective security are inevitable, but our method and justification for how we should engage those strcutures is founded in our scholarship. Alt is a prerequisite and any risk of a link means you vote neg.

Kaldor 99, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance a the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, New & Old Wars, 1999, Stanford University Press, pg 123-124

The failure to take seriously alternative sources of power displays a myopia about the character of power and the relationship between power and violence. An effective response to the new wars has to be based on an alliance between international organizations and local advocates of cosmopolitanism in order to reconstruct legitimacy. A strategy of winning hearts and minds needs to identify with individuals and groups respected for their integrity. They have to be supported, and their advice, proposals, recommendations need to be taken seriously. There is no standard formula for a cosmopolitan response; the point is rather that, in each local situation, there has to be a process involving these individuals and groups through which a strategy is developed. The various components of international involvement — the use of troops, the role of negotiation, funds for reconstruction — need to be worked out jointly. This argument also has implications for the way in which political pressure from the above is exerted on political and military leaders to reach agreement or to consent to peacekeeping forces. Typical methods include the threat of air strikes or economic sanctions, which have the consequence of identifying the leaders with the population instead of isolating them, treating them as representative of ‘sides’, as legitimate leaders of states or proto-states. Such methods can easily be counterproductive, alienating the local population and narrowing the possibilities of pressure below. There may be circumstances in which these methods are an appropriate strategy and others where more targeted approaches may be more effective — arraigning the leaders as war criminals so that they Cannot travel, exempting Cultural communication so as to support civil society, for example. The point is that local cosmopolitans can provide the best advice on what is the best approach; they need to be consulted and treated as partners.

### 2NC – Framework GENERAL

#### Third, HOLD THEM ACCOUNTABLE TO THE 1AC. They replicate heteronormative and hyperracialzed power structures that ensures intervention in the name of violent world order. Rejecting their scholarship requires you to vote neg.

Patricia Hill Collins 90 (Patricia Hill, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park, Former head of the Department of African American Studies at the University of Cincinnati, and the past President of the American Sociological Association Council, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment, p. 62-65)

A second component of the ethic of caring concerns the appropriateness of emotions in dialogues. Emotion indicates that a speaker believes in the validity of an argument. Consider Ntozake Shange’s description of one of the goals of her work: "Our [Western] society allows people to be absolutely neurotic and totally out of touch with their feelings and everyone else’s feelings, and yet be very respectable. This, to me, is a travesty I’m trying to change the idea of seeing emotions and intellect as distinct faculties." The Black women’s blues tradition’s history of personal expressiveness heals this either/or dichotomous rift separating emotion and intellect. For example, in her rendition of "Strange Fruit," Billie Holiday’s lyrics blend seamlessly with the emotion of her delivery to render a trenchant social commentary on southern lynching. Without emotion, Aretha Franklin’s cry for "respect" would be virtually meaningless. A third component of the ethic of caring involves developing the capacity for empathy. Harriet Jones, a 16-year-old Black woman, explains to her interviewer why she chose to open up to him: "Some things in my life are so hard for me to bear, and it makes me feel better to know that you feel sorry about those things and would change them if you could." Without her belief in his empathy, she found it difficult to talk. Black women writers often explore the growth of empathy as part of an ethic of caring. For example, the growing respect that the Black slave woman Dessa and the white woman Rufel gain for one another in Sherley Anne William’s Dessa Rose stems from their increased understanding of each other’s positions. After watching Rufel fight off the advances of a white man, Dessa lay awake thinking: "The white woman was subject to the same ravishment as me; this the thought that kept me awake. I hadn’t knowed white mens could use a white woman like that, just take her by force same as they could with us." As a result of her newfound empathy, Dessa observed, "it was like we had a secret between us." These components of the ethic of caring: the value placed on individual expressiveness, the appropriateness of emotions, and the capacity for empathy-pervade African-American culture. One of the best examples of the interactive nature of the importance of dialogue and the ethic of caring in assessing knowledge claims occurs in the use of the call-and-response discourse mode in traditional Black church services. In such services both the minister and the congregation routinely use voice rhythm and vocal inflection to convey meaning. The sound of what is being said is just as important as the words themselves in what is, in a sense, a dialogue of reason and emotion. As a result it is nearly impossible to filter out the strictly linguistic-cognitive abstract meaning from the sociocultural psychoemotive meaning. While the ideas presented by a speaker must have validity (i.e., agree with the general body of knowledge shared by the Black congregation), the group also appraises the way knowledge claims are presented. There is growing evidence that the ethic of caring may be part of women’s experience as well. Certain dimensions of women’s ways of knowing bear striking resemblance to Afrocentric expressions of the ethic of caring. Belenky et al. point out that two contrasting epistemological orientations characterize knowing: one an epistemology of separation based on impersonal procedures for establishing truth and the other, an epistemology of connection in which truth emerges through care. While these ways of knowing are not gender specific, disproportionate numbers of women rely on connected knowing. The emphasis placed on expressiveness and emotion in African-American communities bears marked resemblance to feminist perspectives on the importance of personality in connected knowing. Separate knowers try to subtract the personality of an individual from his or her ideas because they see personality as biasing those ideas. In contrast, connected knowers see personality as adding to an individual’s ideas and feel that the personality of each group member enriches a group’s understanding. The significance of individual uniqueness, personal expressiveness, and empathy in African-American communities thus resembles the importance that some feminist analyses place on women’s "inner voice." The convergence of Afrocentric and feminist values in the ethic of caring seems particularly acute. White women may have access to a women’s tradition valuing emotion and expressiveness, but few Eurocentric institutions except the family validate this way of knowing. In contrast, Black women have long had the support of the Black church, an institution with deep roots in the African past and a philosophy that accepts and encourages expressiveness and an ethic of caring. Black men share in this Afrocentric tradition. But they must resolve the contradictions that confront them in searching for Afrocentric models of masculinity in the face of abstract, unemotional notions of masculinity imposed on them. The differences among race/gender groups thus hinge on differences in their access to institutional supports valuing one type of knowing over another. Although Black women may be denigrated within white-male-controlled academic institutions, other institutions, such as Black families and churches, which encourage the expression of Black female power, seem to do so, in part, by way of their support for an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. The Ethic of Personal Accountability An ethic of personal accountability is the final dimension of an alternative epistemology. Not only must individuals develop their knowledge claims through dialogue and present them in a style proving their concern for their ideas, but people are expected to be accountable for their knowledge claims. Zilpha Elaw’s description of slavery reflects this notion that every idea has an owner and that the owner’s identity matters: "Oh, the abominations of slavery! ... Every case of slavery, however lenient its infliction and mitigated its atrocities, indicates an oppressor, the oppressed, and oppression." For Elaw abstract definitions of slavery mesh with the concrete identities of its perpetrators and its victims. African-Americans consider it essential for individuals to have personal positions on issues and assume full responsibility for arguing their validity. Assessments of an individual’s knowledge claims simultaneously evaluate an individual’s character, values, and ethics. African-Americans reject the Eurocentric, masculinist belief that probing into an individual’s personal viewpoint is outside the boundaries of discussion. Rather, all views expressed and actions taken are thought to derive from a central set of core beliefs that cannot be other than personal. "Does Aretha really believe that Black women should get ‘respect, or is she just mouthing the words?" is a valid question in an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. Knowledge claims made by individuals respected for their moral and ethical connections to their ideas will carry more weight than those offered by less respected figures. An example drawn from an undergraduate course composed entirely of Black women which I taught might help to clarify the uniqueness of this portion of the knowledge validation process. During one class discussion I asked the students to evaluate a prominent Black male scholar’s analysis of Black feminism. Instead of severing the scholar from his context in order to dissect the rationality of his thesis, my students demanded facts about the author’s personal biography. They were especially interested in concrete details of his life, such as his relationships with Black women, his marital status, and his social class background. By requesting data on dimensions of his personal life routinely excluded in positivist approaches to knowledge validation, they invoked concrete experience as a criterion of meaning. They used this information to assess whether he really cared about his topic and drew on this ethic of caring in advancing their knowledge claims about his work. Furthermore, they refused to evaluate the rationality of his written ideas without some indication of his personal credibility as an ethical human being. The entire exchange could only have occurred as a dialogue among members of a class that had established a solid enough community to employ an alternative epistemology in assessing knowledge claims. The ethic of personal accountability is clearly an Afrocentric value, but is it feminist as well? While limited by its attention to middle-class, white women, Carol Gilligan’s work suggests that there is a female model for moral development whereby women are more inclined to link morality to responsibility, relationships, and the ability to maintain social ties. If this is the case, then African-American women again experience a convergence of values from Afrocentric and female institutions. The use of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology in traditional Black church services illustrates the interactive nature of all four dimensions and also serves as a metaphor for the distinguishing features of an Afrocentric feminist way of knowing. The services represent more than dialogues between the rationality used in examining bible texts and stories and the emotion inherent in the use of reason for this purpose. The rationale for such dialogues involves the task of examining concrete experiences for the presence of an ethic of caring. Neither emotion nor ethics is subordinated to reason. Instead, emotion, ethics, and reason are used as interconnected, essential components in assessing knowledge claims. In an Afrocentric feminist epistemology, values lie at the heart of the knowledge validation process such that inquiry always has an ethical aim. Alternative knowledge claims in and of themselves are rarely threatening to conventional knowledge. Such claims are routinely ignored, discredited, or simply absorbed and marginalized in existing paradigms, Much more threatening is the challenge that alternative epistemologies offer to he basic process used by the powerful to legitimate their knowledge claims. If the epistemology used to validate knowledge comes into question, then all prior knowledge claims validated under the dominant model become suspect. An alternative epistemology challenges all certified knowledge and opens up the question of whether what has been taken to be true can stand the test of alternative ways of validating truth. The existence of a self-defined Black women’s standpoint using an Afrocentric feminist epistemology calls into question the content of what currently passes as truth and simultaneously challenges the process of arriving at the truth.

#### Third, we don’t preclude the 1AC or the possibility of policy focus, we just think that methodology is a prior question – means they don’t have offense. But even if they win policy simulation is good that makes the kritik more important – ethical and methodological questions are critical to avoid policy failure

McAllister et al 12 – School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering Queen’s University Belfast (Keith, with Liu Ping Hui and Stephen McKay, “Evidence and Ethics in Infrastructure Planning”, International Journal of Applied Science and Technology Vol. 2 No. 5; May 2012, dml)

Lack of transparency on matters of policymaking and decision taking raise more ethical questions than answers. There was a definitive disinclination by key respondents to answer on such matters, inferring a reluctance to engage in fearless speech (Foucault, 1983). Nonetheless, such is the importance of these questions that those who provide leadership and wield power must be cognisant of the ramifications of not upholding the ethical standards and principles of legitimacy which justify their position. The professional-political relationship in decision taking is masked in shadow, though this investigation has yielded knowledge inferring that ethical dilemmas face planning practitioners on a daily basis, albeit that most do not perceive it to be a serious issue, as one respondent put it “it‟s just part of the job”.

Such perceptions undermine the ethos upon which the profession is founded and must be redressed. Rudimentary knowledge means that only speculation is possible on the dynamic which is located at the hub of policymaking and decision taking, therefore only those interacting at the foci of power truly understand how outputs emerge from interactive discursive processes. The evidence from this investigation did, however, indicate that cognisance must not just be taken of the professional-political relationship but the professional-professional relationship in the wider planning context. While the sample is admittedly small, there is clearly an issue to address with regard to the impact of power on professional ethics. Professionals, whatever their rank, have a responsibility to dissent (Marcuse, 1976) and it is disconcerting to think that where organisational legitimacy (Tilling, 2004) is taken as read, power-laden structures (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998) may be conducive to the development of an inherent fear to express opinion as it might damage how, at best, they are perceived by their superiors or, at worst, impede career development.

While specifically testing the integrity of professional practitioners is almost impossible, it is vitally important that those who influence decisions at locations where power is wielded hold true to the ethical principles underpinning the profession. Failure to do so will ultimately lead to a catastrophic breakdown of societal approval (Kapland and Ruland, 1992) of the planning profession. Such a scenario may ultimately be conducive to the development and implementation of inappropriate policies and strategies which contribute to the demise of the environment which we strive to protect. Evidence from other jurisdictions suggests that the new infrastructure paradigm for operational practice is generally well placed to face such challenges in terms of “expertise and knowledge” (Sheridan, 2010, p. 10). The findings from this investigation suggest that commissioners and inspectors in the wider planning context are perceived as having the ethical robustness to distance themselves from challenges presented by powerbrokers; and the inherent nature of the approach is such that, unlike advocates who tactically manipulate knowledge or flagrantly misrepresent the truth, commissioners are programmed to use a balance sheet approach underpinned by impartiality (Marcuse, 1976). The task for the IPC commissioners is to remain cognisant of such ethical challenges and match the expectations achieved by their counterparts in other planning decision making arenas.

#### Fourth, Framing is key to effective war policy –– Plan-focus mystifies how their evidence is biased by the perspective and interests of their authors – Can’t sever the knowledge production of the 1AC – it kills advocacy skills and holistic education

### A2 Permutation

#### b) Descriptions of China are not neutral or objective – Their strategies are self-fulfilling prophecies that must be critically interrogated

Pan 4 (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 305-307

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers**/**mainstream China **specialists** see themselves (as representativesof theindispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.

#### c) International law is incapable of resisting imperialism- justifies US actions while leaving the most powerful in charge

Smith, 9 -- Internationalist Socialist Review editorial board member

[Ashley, "Humanitarian imperialism and its apologists," International Socialist Review, Issue 67, Sept 2009, isreview.org/issue/67/humanitarian-imperialism-and-its-apologists, accessed 9-8-13, mss]

Bricmont’s book is a good brief polemic, but he is too apologetic about the betrayals of Stalinism and failures of Third World nationalist governments. For an adequate reconstruction of the left, which is one of his stated goals, we must simultaneously oppose imperialism and criticize Stalinism and nationalist dictatorships as oppressive barriers to the transformation of our world. He also exaggerates the ability of the left to use the UN or international law to resist U.S. imperialism. China Miéville’s book Between Equal Rights is an important corrective to this widespread belief in international law as a means to prevent war and oppression of subject nations. Miéville is an award-winning novelist as well as a Marxist theorist of international law. Miéville argues that international law is the product of imperialism and is actually a vehicle for the dominance of the biggest powers, not a means for progressive opposition. Drawing on the Bolshevik legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis, Miéville contends that generalized commodity exchange under capitalism gave birth to law in its distinctive modern form. Whether between workers and bosses for wage labor or between a buyer and a seller of a product or service, commodity exchange takes place as a contract between legally equal individuals. Thus the legal contract, law, has emerged as the ubiquitous social relation between individuals as well as nation-states in the international system. Coercion, Miéville shows, is intrinsic to this commodity form of law. He writes, “violence—coercion—is at the heart of commodity form, and thus the contract. For a commodity meaningfully to be ‘mine-not-yours’—which is, after all, central to the fact that it is a commodity to be exchange—some forceful capabilities are implied. If there were nothing to defend its ‘mine-ness,’ there would be nothing to stop it becoming ‘yours,’ and then it would no longer be a commodity, as I would not be exchanging it. Coercion is implicit.” Moreover, legal equality masks actual inequality. In the world system, advanced capitalist powers and oppressed nations are not in fact equal. So in a legal contest over the interpretation of, say, the legality of a war, the nation with the greatest power is more likely to win its interpretation over those with less power. To encapsulate the point, Miéville quotes Marx’s observation that between equal rights, force decides. This is particularly so in international law, since there is no sovereign state to oversee and enforce legal rulings as in domestic law. As a result, the interpretation and policing of international law comes down to the capitalist nation-states themselves. As Miéville writes, “this is why international law is a paradoxical form. It is simultaneously a genuine relation between equals and a form that the weaker states cannot hope to win.” Appeals to international law are, therefore, completely incapable of resisting imperialism. For example, International Court of Justice (ICJ) courts ruled that the United States violated Nicaragua’s sovereignty by supporting the Contras and mining the country’s harbors. But the United States ignored the ruling, argued that it was out of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, overrode a Security Council resolution that would have enforced the ruling, and never made any restitution. As Miéville points out, “from the left, one might argue that this evidences that the U.S. has the power to flout law with impunity; alternatively, that the U.S.’s interpretation was the one made actual and that this illustrates the imperial actuality of international law. Either way, out of an apparent legal triumph for progressives, the international legal system is undermined as a site for activism.” Importantly, Miéville argues that we have not entered a new phase of imperialism in which the so-called international community is using international law to undo national sovereignty. He points out that imperialism and its international law, while predicated on sovereign property-owning states, always built in qualifications of sovereignty so that powers could legally intervene in other states. The United States and other powers are using political humanitarianism and various international institutions as ideological justification and tools for traditional inter-imperial conflicts and to intervene in weaker nations.

#### d) Heg and soft power are born out of the need for globalization and totalization of the Other

Nayar 99 Copyright (c) 1999 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Fall, 1999 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599. “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity” Jayan Nayar (Ph. D from the University of Cambridge, Professor of International Development Law and Human Rights and the University of Warwick) cylab.info/u/JQ/texts/Nayar-\_Orders\_of\_Inhumanity.doc

Order as Evolutionary Structure: The potency of the term "world-order" to mobilize human imagination lies in its appeal to something almost divine: the civilizational project that is the natural path of human evolution, our common destiny, inherently good, bound by the "cords of the heart." n13 In this respect, "order" is presented as standing in opposition to the undesired condition of "disorder." Therefore, to construct an order out of this condition which, at best, is one of nothingness, and at worst, one of chaos and anarchy, stands as a task of historic human responsibility. Being of the "order of things," so to speak, we may regard the project of creating order, of "ordering," as inherent and intrinsic to human history in its movement toward ever greater levels of evolutionary unfolding. This assumption of order gives rise to a Cartesian conception of the organization of human relationships, wherein the progressive evolution of human civilization entails the mechanical, "neutral" and necessary process of amalgamating diversity ("disorder") into an efficient and unitary total structure of world-order. Order as Coercive Command: The flip side of order as "structure" is order as "command." Viewed in this way, it is the present of the coercive process of "ordering" rather than the future of the emancipatory condition/structure of order that becomes emphasized. There is nothing "natural," "evolutionist" or "neutral" about world-order when the command of ordering is made visible. The vision of civilization as mechanical organization of the component parts of "humanity" is no longer tenable when the coercion of command to fit into this order is exposed. World-order, then, no longer describes the "order" of the world open to discovery, but rather, the "ordering" of the world open to conflict. [\*606] Distinguishing these two meanings of "order" provides us with radically opposed directions of analysis and orientations for future imagings of social relations. Although the rhetoric of world-order would focus on visions of some projected "world" that provides the aspiration for collective endeavors, "order" does not come to be without necessary "ordering;" the "world" of "world-order" has not come to be without the necessary ordering of many worlds. The ordering and the ordered, the world of order and the ordered world, all are inextricable parts of the past and the present of "civil-ization." Despite the vision of world-order founded on a notion of a universal society of humankind aspiring toward a universal common good, (first given meaning within a conceptual political-legal framework through the birth of the so-called "Westphalian" state system n14 ), the materialities of "ordering" were of a different complexion altogether. Contrary to the disembodied rhetoric of world-order as bloodless evolution, the new images of the world and languages of "globality" did not evolve out of a sense of "hospitality" n15 to the "other," the "stranger." Rather, the history of the creation of the post-Westphalian "world" as one world, can be seen to be most intimately connected with the rise of an expansionist and colonizing world-view and practice. Voyages of "discovery" provided the necessary reconnaissance to image this "new world." Bit by bit, piece by piece, the jigsaw of the globe was completed. With the advance of the "discoverer," the "colonizer," the "invader," the "new" territories were given meaning within the hermeneutic construct that was the new "world."

#### e) Heg causes paranoid imperial violence – there are no global threats – extinction is inevitable because US scenario planning is grounded in pursuing constructed threats – causes error replication that culminate in eternal warfare

Engelhardt 12 (Tom, Fellow at the Nation Institute, “Overwrought empire: The discrediting of US military power,” 10/12 <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/20121010104331399712.html>)

And here's the odd thing: in a sense, little has changed since then and yet everything seems different. Think of it as the American imperial paradox: **everywhere** there are now "**threats"** against our well-being which seem to demand action and yet nowhere are there commensurate enemies to go with them. Everywhere the US military still reigns supreme by almost any measure you might care to apply; and yet - in case the paradox has escaped you - **nowhere can it achieve its goals, however modest**. At one level, the American situation should simply take your breath away. Never before in modern history had there been an arms race of only one or a great power confrontation of only one. And at least in military terms, just as the [neoconservatives imagined](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175336/tomgram%3A_engelhardt,_war_is_a_drug/) in those early years of the 21st century, the US remains the "sole superpower" or even "hyperpower" of planet Earth. The planet's top gun And yet the more dominant the US military becomes in its ability to destroy and the more its forces are spread across the globe, the more the **defeats** and semi-defeats **pile up**, the more the **missteps and mistakes grow**, the more the strains show, the more [the suicides rise](http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-09-26/news/bs-md-army-suicides-2-20120926_1_suicide-rate-suicide-prevention-army), the more the nation's treasure [disappears](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175545/hellman_kramer_war_pay) down a black hole - and in response to all of this, the more moves the Pentagon makes. A great power without a significant enemy? You might have to go back to the Roman Empire at its height or some Chinese dynasty in full flower to find anything like it. And yet Osama bin Laden is dead. Al-Qaeda is reportedly a shadow of its former self. The great regional threats of the moment, North Korea and Iran, are regimes held together by baling wire and the suffering of their populaces. The only incipient great power rival on the planet, China, has [just launched](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/world/asia/china-shows-off-an-aircraft-carrier-but-experts-are-skeptical.html) its first aircraft carrier, a refurbished Ukrainian throwaway from the 1990s on whose deck the country has no planes capable of landing. The US has [1,000](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175338/nick_turse_pentagon%27s_planet%29_of_bases) or more bases around the world; other countries, a [handful](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175592/engelhardt_monopolizing_war). The US spends as much on its military as the next [14 powers](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15/the-15-countries-with-the-highest-military-expenditure-in-2011-table/view) (mostly allies) combined. In fact, it's investing an estimated [$1.45 trillion](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/29/us-lockheed-fighter-idUSBRE82S03L20120329) to produce and operate a single future aircraft, the F-35 - more than any country, the US included, now spends on its national defence annually. The US military is singular in other ways, too. It alone has divided the globe - the complete world - into [six "commands"](http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175308/tomgram%3A_engelhardt,_american_warscapes). With (lest anything be left out) an added command, [Stratcom](http://www.stratcom.mil/), for the heavens and another, recently established, for the only space not previously occupied, [cyberspace](http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/cyber_command/), where we're already unofficially "[at war](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html)". No other country on the planet thinks of itself in faintly comparable military terms. When its high command plans for its future "needs," thanks to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, they repair (don't say "retreat") to a military base south of the capital where they argue out their future and war-game various possible crises while [striding across](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/us/top-general-dempsey-maps-out-us-military-future.html) a map of the world larger than a basketball court. What other military would come up with such a method? The president now has at his command not one, but two private armies. The first is the CIA, which in [recent years](http://www.salon.com/2011/04/28/petraeus_13/) has been [heavily militarised](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-blurring-of-cia-and-military/2011/05/31/AGsLhkGH_story.html), is overseen by a former four-star general (who calls the job "[living the dream](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/us/politics/petraeus-is-eyeing-princetons-top-job-paper-says.html)"), and is running its own private assassination campaigns and drone air wars throughout the Greater Middle East. The second is an [expanding elite](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175547/andrew_bacevich_golden_age_of_special_operations), the Joint Special Operations Command, [cocooned](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175426/nick_turse_a_secret_war_in_120_countries) inside the US military, members of whom are now deployed to hot spots around the globe. The US Navy, with its [11 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier](http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1460) task forces, is dominant on the global waves in a way that only the British Navy might once have been; and the US Air Force controls the global skies in much of the world in a totally uncontested fashion. (Despite numerous wars and conflicts, the [last](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34182338/ns/us_news-military/#.UGzXexgVmHk) American plane possibly downed in aerial combat was in the first Gulf War in 1991.) Across much of the global south, there is no sovereign space Washington's drones can't penetrate to kill those [judged](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175551/tom_engelhardt_assassin_in_chief) by the White House to be threats. In sum, the US is now the sole planetary [Top Gun](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175368/When) in a way that empire-builders once undoubtedly fantasised about, but that none from Genghis Khan on have ever achieved: alone and essentially uncontested on the planet. In fact, by every measure (except success), the likes of it has never been seen. Blindsided by predictably unintended consequences By all the usual measuring sticks, the US should be supreme in a historically unprecedented way. And yet it couldn't be more obvious that it's not, that despite all the bases, elite forces, private armies, drones, aircraft carriers, wars, conflicts, strikes, interventions, and clandestine operations, despite a [labyrinthine intelligence bureaucracy](http://www.intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence-community/) that never seems to stop growing and into which we pour a minimum of [$80bn a year](http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/02/13/80-billion-puzzle-the-part-of-the-pentagons-budget-you-wont-see/), **nothing seems to work out** in an imperially satisfying way. It couldn't be more obvious that this is not a glorious dream, but some kind of ever-expanding **imperial nightmare**. This should, of course, have been self-evident since at least early 2004, less than a year after the Bush administration invaded and occupied Iraq, when the roadside bombs started to explode and the suicide bombings to mount, while the comparisons of the US to Rome and of a prospective Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East to the Pax Romana vanished like a morning mist on a blazing day. Still, the wars against relatively small, ill-armed sets of insurgents dragged toward their dismally predictable ends. (It says the world that, after almost 11 years of war, the 2,000th US military death in Afghanistan [occurred](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/09/30/afghan-us-insider-attacks/1603753/) at the hands of an Afghan "ally" in an "insider attack".) In those years, Washington continued to be regularly blindsided by the unintended consequences of its military moves. Surprises - none pleasant - became the order of the day and victories proved vanishingly rare. One thing seems obvious: a superpower military with unparalleled capabilities for one-way destruction **no longer** has the more basic **ability to impose its will** anywhere on the planet. Quite the opposite, US military power has been remarkably **discredited globally** by the most pitiful of forces. From Pakistan to Honduras, just about anywhere it goes in the old colonial or neocolonial world, in those regions known in the contested Cold War era as the Third World, resistance of one unexpected sort or another arises and failure ensues in some often long-drawn-out and spectacular fashion. Given the lack of enemies - a few thousand jihadis, a small set of minority insurgencies, a couple of feeble regional powers - why this is so, what exactly the force is that prevents Washington's success, remains mysterious. Certainly, it's in some way related to the more than half-century of decolonisation movements, rebellions and insurgencies that were a feature of the previous century. It also has something to do with the way economic heft has spread beyond the US, Europe and Japan - with the rise of the "tigers" in Asia, the explosion of the Chinese and Indian economies, the advances of Brazil and Turkey, and the movement of the planet toward some kind of genuine economic multi-polarity. It may also have something to do with the end of the Cold War, which put an end as well to several centuries of imperial or great power competition and left the sole "victor", it now seems clear, heading toward the exits wreathed in self-congratulation. Explain it as you will, it's as if the planet itself, or humanity, had somehow been [inoculated](http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175510/andy_kroll_how_empires_fall) against the imposition of imperial power, as if it now rejected it whenever and wherever applied. In the previous century, it took a half-nation, North Korea, backed by Russian supplies and Chinese troops to fight the US to a draw, or a popular insurgent movement backed by a local power, North Vietnam, backed in turn by the Soviet Union and China to defeat American power. Now, small-scale minority insurgencies, largely using roadside bombs and suicide bombers, are fighting American power to a draw (or worse) with no great power behind them at all. Think of the growing force that resists such military might as the equivalent of the "dark matter" in the universe. The evidence is in. We now know (or should know) that it's there, even if we can't see it. Washington's wars on autopilot After the last decade of military failures, stand-offs and frustrations, you might think that this would be apparent in Washington. After all, the US is now visibly an overextended empire, its sway waning from the Greater Middle East to Latin America, the [limits of its power](http://www.amazon.com/dp/0805090169/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20) increasingly evident. And yet, here's the curious thing: two administrations in Washington have drawn none of the obvious conclusions and no matter how the presidential election turns out, it's already clear that, in this regard, nothing will change. Even as military power has proven itself a bust again and again, our policymakers have come to rely ever more completely on a **military-first response** to global problems. In other words, we are not just a classically overextended empire, but also an overwrought one operating on some kind of **militarised autopilot**. Lacking is a learning curve. By all evidence, it's not just that there isn't one, but that there can't be one. Washington, it seems, now has only one mode of thought and action, no matter who is at the helm or what the problem may be, and it always involves, directly or indirectly, openly or clandestinely, the **application of militarised force**. Nor does it matter that each further application only destabilises some region yet more or undermines further what once were known as "American interests". Take Libya, as an example. It briefly seemed to count as a rare American military success story: a decisive intervention in support of a rebellion against a brutal dictator - so brutal, in fact, that the CIA previously [shipped](http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/06/us/us-libya-torture-report/index.html) "terrorist suspects", Islamic rebels fighting against the Gaddafi regime, there for torture. No US casualties resulted, while American and NATO air strikes were decisive in bringing a set of ill-armed, ill-organised rebels to power. In the world of unintended consequences, however, the fall of Gaddafi sent Tuareg mercenaries from his militias, armed with high-end weaponry, [across the border](http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/blue_man_coup_how_gadhafis_mercenaries_broke_mali_20120516/) into Mali. There, when the dust settled, the whole northern part of the country had come unhinged and fallen under the sway of Islamic extremists and al-Qaeda wannabes as other parts of North Africa threatened to destabilise. At the same time, of course, the first American casualties of the intervention occurred when Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans died in an attack on the Benghazi consulate and a local "safe house". With matters worsening regionally, the response couldn't have been more predictable. As Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock of the Washington Post recently [reported](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-secret-meetings-examine-al-qaeda-threat-in-north-africa/2012/10/01/f485b9d2-0bdc-11e2-bd1a-b868e65d57eb_story.html?socialreader_check=0&amp;denied=1), in ongoing secret meetings, the White House is planning for military operations against al-Qaeda-in-the-Magreb (North Africa), now armed with weaponry pillaged from Gaddafi's stockpiles. These plans evidently include the approach used in Yemen (US special forces on the ground and CIA drone strikes), or a Somalia "formula" (drone strikes, special forces operations, CIA operations and the support of African proxy armies), or even at some point "the possibility of direct US intervention". In addition, Eric Schmitt and David Kilpatrick of the New York Times [report](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/world/africa/us-said-to-be-preparing-potential-targets-tied-to-libya-attack.html)that the Obama administration is "preparing retaliation" against those it believes killed the US ambassador, possibly including "drone strikes, special operations raids like the one that killed Osama bin Laden and joint missions with Libyan authorities". The near certainty that, like the previous intervention, this next set of military actions will only further destabilise the region with yet more unpleasant surprises and unintended consequences hardly seems to matter. Nor does the fact that, in crude form, the results of such acts are known to us ahead of time have an effect on the unstoppable urge to plan and order them. Such situations are increasingly [legion](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/africa/private-army-leaves-troubled-legacy-in-somalia.html) across the Greater Middle East and elsewhere. Take one other tiny example: Iraq, from which, after almost a decade-long military disaster, the "last" US units essentially fled in the [middle of the night](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/world/middleeast/last-convoy-of-american-troops-leaves-iraq.html) as 2011 ended. Even in those last moments, the Obama administration and the Pentagon were [still trying](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-13/army-chief-dempsey-willing-to-keep-u-s-troops-in-iraq-past-2011.html) to keep significant numbers of US troops there (and, in fact, did manage to [leave behind](http://news.antiwar.com/2012/10/01/us-may-keep-units-american-troops-in-iraq-despite-lack-of-authority/) possibly several hundred as trainers of elite Iraqi units). Meanwhile, Iraq has been supportive of the embattled Syrian regime and drawn ever closer to Iran, even as its own sectarian strife has ratcheted upward. Having watched this unsettling fallout from its last round in the country, [according to](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/world/middleeast/iraq-faces-new-perils-from-syrias-civil-war.html?pagewanted=2) the New York Times, the US is now negotiating an agreement "that could result in the return of small units of American soldiers to Iraq on training missions. At the request of the Iraqi government, according to General Caslen, a unit of Army Special Operations soldiers was recently deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and help with intelligence". Don't you just want to speak to those negotiators the way you might to a child: No, don't do that! The urge to return to the scene of their previous disaster, however, seems unstaunchable. You could offer various explanations for why our policymakers, military and civilian, continue in such a repetitive - and even from an imperial point of view - **self-destructive** vein in situations where unpleasant surprises are essentially guaranteed and **lack of success a given**. Yes, there is the military-industrial complex to be fed. Yes, we are interested in the control of crucial resources, especially energy, and so on. But it's probably more reasonable to say that a **deeply militarised mindset** and the **global maneuvers** that go with it are by now just part of the way of life of a Washington **eternally "at war".** They are the tics of a great power with the equivalent of Tourette's Syndrome. They happen because they can't help but happen, because they are **engraved** in the **policy DNA of our national security complex**, and can evidently no longer be altered. In other words, they can't help themselves.

#### f) Their justification for preserving the economy engrains flawed statistical and actor analysis that will entrench inequality and violence.

Kaldor 99, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance a the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, New & Old Wars, 1999, Stanford University Press, pg 104-107

Essentially, the fragmentation and informalization of war is paralleled by the informalization of the economy. In place of the national formal economy with its emphasis on industrial production and state regulation, a new type of globalized informal economy is established in which external flows, especially hu manitarian assistance and remittances from abroad are integrated into a local and regional economy based on asset transfer and extra-legal trading. Figure 5.1 illustrates the typical resource flows of a new war. It is assumed that there ¡s no production and no taxation. Instead, external support to ordinary people, in the form of remittances and humanitarian assistance, is recycled via various forms of asset transfer and black-market trading into military resources. Direct assistance from foreign governments, protection money from producers of commodities and assist ance from the diaspora enhance the capacity of the various fight ing units to extract further resources from ordinary people and thus sustain their military efforts. Mark Dufflelci describes how this functioned in the Sudanese case where an illegal dollar trade involving Sudan, Zaire and Uganda was operated, making use of relief convoys both for trans port and to control prices: In the case of Sudan, the parallel economy Consists oía number of interconnecting levels or systems. Local asset transfer is linked to national level extra-legal mercantile activity. In turn, this ar ticulates with higher-level political and state relations together with regional and international parallel nebvorks which trade in commodities and hard currency. It is this level that provides the initial site for the integration of international aid and relief assistance with the parallel economy. As assets how upwards and outwards, culminating in capital flight, international assist ance flows downwards through the same or related systems of power.’Just as it is possible to find examples of military cooperation between fighting units so as to divide up territory or to foster mutual hatred among the respective populations, so it is possible to find examples of economic cooperation. David Keen describes what is known as the ‘sell-game’ in Sierra Leone, through which government forces sell arms and ammunition to the rebels: [Government forces] withdraw from a town, leaving arms and ammunition for the rebels behind them. The rebels pick up the arms and extract the loot, mostly in the form of cash, from the townspeople and then they themselves retreat. At this point, the government forces reoccupy the town and engage in their own looting, usually of property (which the rebels find hard to dis pose of) as well as engaging in illegal mining John Simpson describes how Peruvian government soldiers set free captured Shining Path guerrillas ‘apparently in order to per petuate insecurity in areas where officers can benefit from illegal tradIng — in this case, principally the trade in cocaine.”9 There are similar examples in the Bosnian war which I have described in chapter 3.Some writers argue that economic motivation explains the new type of warfare. David Keen suggests that a ‘war where one avoids battles but picks on unarmed civilians and perhaps eventually acquires a Mercedes may make more sense... [than] risk¡ng death in the name of the nation-state with little or no prospect of significant financial gain’.20 But economic motivation alone is insufficient to explain the scale, brutality and sheer viciousness of new wars.2’ No doubt some join the fighting as a way of legitimizing criminal activities, providing a political justification for what they do and socially sanctioning otherwise illegal methods of financial gain. No doubt there are others — rational power-seekers, extreme fanatics or victims intent on revenge — who engage in criminal activities to sustain their political military goals. Yet others are press-ganged into the fighting, propelled by fear and hunger. The point is rather that the modem distinctions between the political and the economic, the public and the private, the military and the civil are breaking down. Political control Is required to embed the new coercive forms of economic exchange, which in tum are required to provide a viable financial basis for thenew gangsters/powerholders in the context of state disintegra tion and economic marginalization. A new retrograde set of social relationships is being estabLished in which economics and violence are deeply intertwined within the shared framework of identity politics.

#### Fourth, thinking that we can resist the structures of imperialism while endorsing problematic policies and world views ensures that we become amoral political subjects bound to imperial empathy. Any inclusion of the plan coopts the alternative and makes it a footnote.

Abbas 10, Asma Abbas, Professor and Division Head in Social Studies, Political Science, Philosophy at the Liebowitz Center for International Studies at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 38-39/

The dizzying back and forth between professed Kantians and Humeans blurs the fact that, regardless of whether morality is anchored interior to the acting subject or determined by the effects of the actions of the subject as they play out in the outside world, the unit of analysis is quite the same. Thus, when touchy liberals desire better attention to the fact of human pain and suffering, they manage to talk about cruelty where, ironically, cruel actions are derivatives of cruel agents and the victim’s suffering is just fallout. Besides this shared inability to dispel the primacy of the agent and the perpetrator in favor of the sufferer of pain, the rift between Kant and Hume is deceptive in another way. In terms of historical evolution, the current status of cruelty betrays a fetish of the active agent. It is no accident that the terms “good” and “evil” require a focus on cruelty and its infliction, leaving untouched the suffering of cruelty. Moral psychology ends up being the psychology of cruelty, which is amoral question, and hence of those who cause it. In the same frame, suffering is never a moral, let alone political or legal, question unless amoral agent with a conscience has caused it. All sufferers automatically become victims in the eyes of politics and law when “recognized.” Suffering is thus relevant as a political question only after it is a moral one, when it is embodied and located in a certain way, when it surpasses arbitrary thresholds. It is one thing to claim that liberalism, whether empiricist or idealist, cannot overcome its subject-centeredness even in its moments of empathy for the “victim.” It is another to understand the stubborn constitution of the agent at the helm of liberal justice and ask what makes it so incurable and headstrong and what the temperament of this stubbornness might be: is it pathetic, squishy, helplessly compassionate, humble, philanthropic, imperialist, venomous, neurotic, all of the above, or none of these? Not figuring out this pathos is bound to reduce all interaction with liberal assertions to one or another act of editing or “correcting” them. Inadvertently, all protests to liberalism tread a limited, predictable path and will be, at some point, incorporated within it. Liberalism’s singular gall and violence is accessed every time a resistance to it is accommodated by liberalism. Think, for instance, not only of how often liberals affirm their clumsiness and mediocrity in speaking for the other’s suffering but also of how quickly its antagonists—purveyors of many a righteous anti-representational politics—“make space” for the voice of others without challenging the (liberal, colonizing) structures that determine and distribute the suffering and speaking self, and the suffering and speaking other, to begin with. This protest leaves unquestioned what it means to speak for one’s own, or others’, suffering and whether there are other ways of speaking suffering that problematize these as the only options.

#### Fifth, the affirmative seeks to create a geopolitical world order while providing us with the knowledge of how to get there. Their truth claims conflate bad notions of power and knowledge that corrupts agency.

Burke, 7 (Anthony, senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence, and Reason,” Vol. 10, No. 2, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind.

### 2NC – Alt

#### This debate round matters – critical interrogation of our war policy and adaptation to “new wars” is critical to create a new form of scholarship that is predicated on local, national, and global scholarship external from the status quo security apparatus.

Kaldor 13, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, “In Defence of New Wars,” March 7, 2013, Stability, 2(1): 4, pp. 1-16, <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/download/sta.at/40%E2%80%8E>

The debate about new wars has helped to refine and reformulate the argument. The debate about Clausewitz has facilitated a more conceptual interpretation of new wars, while the debate about data has led to the identification of new sources of evidence that have helped to substantiate the main proposition. The one thing the critics tend to agree is that the new war thesis has been important in opening up new scholarly analysis and new policy perspectives, which, as I have stressed, was the point of the argument (Newman 2004; Henderson and Singer 2002). The debate has taken this further. It has contributed to the burgeoning field of conflict studies. And it has had an influence on the intensive policy debates that are taking place especially within the military, ministries of defence and international organisations the debates about counter-insurgency in the Pentagon, for example, or about human security in the European Union and indeed about non-traditional approaches to security in general. What is still lacking in the debate is the demand for a cosmopolitan political response. In the end, policing, the rule of law, justice mechanisms and institution-building depend on the spread of norms at local, national and global levels, and norms are constructed both through scholarship and public debate. If we are to reconceptualise political violence as ‘new war’ or crime and the use of force as cosmopolitan law enforcement rather than war-fighting, then we have to be able to challenge the claims of those who conceptualise political violence as ‘old war’, and this can only be done through critical publicly-engaged analysis.

#### Further, the aff doesn’t solve war – their models are outdated and will only enforce negative power strcutures. The alt is key to solve the aff.

Kaldor 99, Mary Kaldor, professor of Global Governance a the London School of Economics and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, New & Old Wars, 1999, Stanford University Press, pg 90-91

The term ‘war economy’ usually refers to a system which is centralized, totalizing and autarchic, as was the case in the total wars of the twentieth century. Administration is centralized to increase the efficiency of the war and to maximize revenue to pay for the war. As many people as possible are mobilized to participate in the war effort either as soldiers or in the production of arms arid necessities. By and large, the war effort is self-sufficient, although in World War Il, Britain and the Soviet Union received lend-lease assistance from the United States. The main aim of the war effort is to maximize the use of force so as to engage and defeat the enemy in battle. The new type of war economy is almost totally the opposite. The new wars are ‘globalized’ wars. They involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state. Participation is low relative to the population both because of lack of pay and because of lack of legitimacy on the part of the warring parties. There is very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support. Battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring factions ¡s common. Those who conceive of war in traditional Clausewitzean terms, based on definable geo-political goals, fail to understand the underlying vested interests, both political and economic in the continuation of war. They tend to assume that political solutions can be found without any need to address the underlying economic logic. At the same time, however, those who recognize the irrelevance of traditional perceptions of war and observe the complexity of the political, social and economic relationships expressed in these wars tend to conclude that this type of violence can be equated with anarchy. In these circumstances, the most that can be done is to treat the symptoms through, for example, humanitarian assistance. In this chapter, 1 argue that it is possible to analyse the typical political economy of new wars so as to draw conclusions about possible alternative approaches. Indeed, the implication of such an analysis is that many of the well-meaning efforts of various international actors, based on inherited assumptions about the character of war, may turn out to be counterproductive. Conflict resolution from above may merely enhance the legitimacy of the warring parties and allow time for replenishment; humanitarian assistance may contribute to the functioning of the war economy; peacekeeping troops may lose legitimacy either by standing aside when terrible crimes are committed or by siding with groups who commit terrible crimes. In the first section, I describe the various fighting units typical of contemporary wars and how they have emerged out of the disintegration of the states formal security capacities. Then, I analyse patterns of violence and the character of military strategy and the way these have evolved out of the conflicts that developed during and after the Second World War as a way of reacting against or coping with modern conventional war— guerrilla warfare, cou n terinsurgency, and the low-intensity’ conflicts of the 1980s, Next, I consider how the fighting units acquire resources with which to fight the new wars and the interaction between the new pattern of violence and the social relations that are generated in the con text of war. In the final section, I describe how the new wars, or rather the social conditions of the new wars, tend to spread.

## 1NR

### Solvency

#### The plan’s legal constraints sanitize the violence of the state, de-legitimatizing alternatives to permanent war

Tran-Creque, 13 -- Center for the Study of the Drone

[Steven, "The Forever War is Always Hungry," Center for the Study of the Drone (at Bard College), 6-5-13, dronecenter.bard.edu/the-forever-war-is-always-hungry/, accessed 9-1-13, mss]

And so on. In both popular discourse and the policy press, pundits and commentators have overwhelmingly adopted the same familiar blueprint: a legalistic invocation of sovereignty that emphasizes borders and governmental authority to the exclusion much else. There is a dangerous intellectual poverty in this. We are not, as Trevor Paglen recently observed, “moving toward a surveillance state: we live in the heart of one.” This is the era of total surveillance and extrajudicial killing, of public austerity and mass incarceration, of permanent unemployment and global warming: what Jakob Augstein recognized last week in Der Spiegel as nothing short of totalitarianism. The extraordinary measures of rendition, black sites, secret laws, black budgets and retroactive legalizations that have accompanied the vicious internal targeting of Muslims, protesters and whistleblowers—all of this has become the new normal, and coming decades will reap the whirlwind. This is what Paglen has dubbed the “terror state”: not merely the possibility of “turnkey tyranny” one step away, but its virtual inevitability. As the War on Terror now transforms into the forever war, I think we must begin by asking how exactly we ever got here. Of course, at first glance, the connection between all of this and the question of whose legal jurisdiction prevails in Waziristan seems faint at best. Certainly, no matter how broadly one reads the term “war,” one struggles to find in this anything like the strangely resilient imagery of nation states battling each other with state of the art weaponry, no matter how much this continues to dominate the way we think of war. In none of the usual accounts can one find something like Jean Bodin’s definition of sovereignty as “the absolute and perpetual power of the republic,” one of the principal influences from which Carl Schmitt famously drew his definition of the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception” to the law. But I would insist: these are not esoteric historical or theoretical concerns. I want to offer a very different approach here to the question of what sovereignty means. Sovereignty has never been an anodyne policy question of whose jurisdiction applies, of who controls drones, or of how visible such clandestine military programs will be. Rather, following Eyal Weizman, one should begin by asking how sovereignty came to be exercised as the economistic management of death. In the strangest of places, David Graeber’s historical critique of an old anthropological debate over the divine kingship of the Shilluk of Southern Sudan offers what I find to be the most compelling explanation for the forever war. That is, that the War on Terror is better understood as an unusually visible example of the constitutive principle of sovereignty: a permanent war between the sovereign and everyone else—the only kind of war there is. This is why, as Teju Cole once remarked, the forever war is always hungry. The Raw Material of Sovereignty Weizman’s question is simple. “How, after the evacuation of the ground surface of Gaza, did bodies, rather than territories, or death, rather than space, turn into the raw material of Israeli sovereignty?” In Weizman’s Thanato-tactics, sovereignty is simply the management of death. The Israeli General Security Service’s assassination program, which began in 2000—before 9/11—produced the sprawling surveillance and counterinsurgency apparatus of the occupation. But it also provided the template and testing grounds for the United States’ own assassination program. What Weizman is really interested in is the logic of the lesser evil, by which economizing language produces this environment of managed death. From this perspective, collateral damage calculations are not a humanitarian triumph limiting the scope of violence**.** Rather, **they are a crucial part of the ideological apparatus by which acts of state violence are rendered** legal and **legitimate,** encompassed within the permissible logic of forestalling greater violence**.** Weizman quotes Israeli Air Force commander Eliezer Shkedi saying, before the 2006 invasion of Gaza, that “the only alternative to aerial attacks is a ground operation and the reoccupation.” Assassination, he added, “is the most precise tool we have.” So too with proportionality, balancing, efficiency, pragmatism, the injunction to “be realistic,” and the entire pantheon of reasonable constraints. All of the oppositional forces of military interests and intelligence agencies, human rights groups and journalists, can be incorporated within the same project: the maintenance of humanitarian violence, albeit one that bills itself as a lesser form of violence compared to the alternatives. As Will Saletan put it in Slate earlier this year with memorable enthusiasm: Drones kill fewer civilians, as a percentage of total fatalities, than any other military weapon. They’re the worst form of warfare in the history of the world, except for all the others. … civilian casualties? That’s not an argument against drones. It’s the best thing about them. The choice presented is always between assassination and invasion, between Hellfire missiles and imprecise bombs—between fewer dead and more dead. It is not a choice between war and peace. Well-trained commentators cannot even imagine a world in which such things simply do not happen. And **one never questions the legitimacy of the system in which**, as Hannah Arendt emphasized, **one must choose evil**. Periodic eruptions of unchecked violence—as in the Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008 and the bombardment in 2012—are neither accidents nor failures. The **normal practice of violence** through checkpoints, annexation, resource extraction, and assassination is maintained against the the ever present threat of greater violence, regularly demonstrated. **The greater evil kept at bay by the lesser evil, in an endless state of war.** This permanent threat of arbitrary violence is precisely what we call sovereignty. The Only War there Is Beginning with his observation that states are “at the same time forms of institutionalized raiding or extortion, and utopian projects,” David Graeber’s definition of sovereignty is simple enough: “the right to exercise violence with impunity.” Graeber offers the example of the Ganda kingship to the south of the Shilluk. In the late 19th century, European visitors to the court of King Mutesa offered a gift of firearms. Mutesa responded by firing the rifle in the street and killing his subjects at random. When David Livingstone asked why the Ganda king killed so many people, he was told that “if [the king] didn’t, everyone would assume that he was dead.” However, the notoriety of the Ganda kings for arbitrary, random violence towards their own people did not prevent Mutesa from also being accepted as supreme judge and guardian of the state’s system of justice. Indeed, it was the very foundation for it. Specifically, Graeber is interested in the transcendent quality of violence: the violence and transgression of the king makes him “a creature beyond morality.” Paradoxically, the sovereign may be arbitrarily violent—the etymology here is telling—and nevertheless seen as the supreme source of justice and law. Graeber calls this transcendent aspect of violence “divine.” It isn’t just that kings act like gods; it’s that they do so and get away with it. This remains the case in the modern state. Walter Benjamin’s famous distinction between “law-making” and “law-maintaining” violence refers to the same phenomenon. We often say that no one is above the law, but if this were true, there would be no one to bring the legal order into being in the first place: the signers of the Declaration of Independence or the American Constitution were all traitors by the legal order under which they were born. There really is no resolution to this paradox. The solution of the left is that the people may rise up periodically and overthrow the existing legal regime in a revolution. The solution of the right is Carl Schmitt’s exception: that sovereignty is exercised by the head of state in putting aside the legal order. But whichever solution one prefers, this really just defers the dilemma: all sovereignty is built on a foundation of illegal acts of violence, and it always carries the immanent potential for arbitrary violence. In 19th-century accounts of rainmakers in Southern Sudan, the function of violence is even clearer. With rainmakers, as with Shilluk kings, the health of the land is tied to the health of the king. If the rains fail to fall, first people will bring petitions, then gifts. But after a certain point, if the rains still don’t come, the rainmaker must either flee or face a community united to kill him. It isn’t hard to see why rainmakers would want something like the state’s monopoly on violence or a retinue of loyal, armed followers. But the crucial point is that insofar as “the people” could be said to exist, they were essentially seen as the collective enemy of the king. European explorers in the region often found kings raiding enemy villages only to find that the villages contained the king’s own subjects. They were delivering arbitrary violence to the people they were supposed to protect. So Graeber reminds us, “predatory violence was and would always remain the essence of sovereignty.” Such is the hidden logic of sovereignty. Above all, it depends on the transcendent quality of violence that allows the sovereign to become, as Hobbes put it, a “mortal god.” But this is also means that arbitrary violence is the constitutive principle of sovereignty, defining the relationship between the sovereign and everything else: What we call ‘the social peace’ is really just a truce in a constitutive war between sovereign power and ‘the people,’ or ‘nation’—both of whom come into existence, as political entities, in their struggle against each other. There is no inside or outside here. Contra Schmitt and his friend-enemy distinction, this constitutive war precedes wars between nations and peoples. From the perspective of sovereign power, “there is no fundamental difference in the relation between a sovereign and his people, and a sovereign and his enemies,” explains Graeber. This constitutive war is a war the sovereign can never win—a forever war that can never end. No War but the Forever War What exactly is one supposed to make of John Brennan’s admission that the war against Al Qaeda will continue for another decade? How did the AUMF and the Patriot Act together come to constitute something like America’s Article 48, creating a permanent state of exception in which something like the NSA’s “giant automated Stasi” is simply accepted as the new normal? How did drones become an inevitable part of the near future in New York City? After all, the War on Terror really isn’t anything like a war at all— at least, not in the conventional imaginary of nation states commanding disciplined military forces on established fields of battle. The United States commands a degree of military power and comparative dominance simply unprecedented in human history—what is elegantly referred to, in the anodyne language of military planners, as “asymmetry.” There are no strictly defined battlefields, and the formal enemies in the War on Terror have rarely amounted to more than the insurgent army of a deposed dictator (funded and armed by the U.S., albeit long ago) and a few hundred religious students in the mountains of Central Asia. It is in fact genuinely strange how resiliently this conventional image seems to persist in both popular and intellectual imagination. Even scholarly responses to the War on Terror begin from the assumption that something new and strange is happening when battlefields and opponents alike are no longer delimited but rather always and everywhere. If one limits oneself to legal documents, this is pretty much the only possible conclusion. The conventional imagery really seems to be most useful in obscuring the more fundamental realities of what war really is. In part, war consists of the far more common practice of civil wars, guerrilla wars, genocide and internal repression—but also, in a larger sense, the fundamental state of war between the sovereign and his people that is the originary, constitutive state for sovereign power itself. The forever war, then, has effectively allowed the United States to claim sovereignty to farthest reaches of the earth. Certainly, this is not a question purely of drones: the apparatus also consists of a deep surveillance state, total international digital surveillance, a military larger than the combined militaries of the rest of the world, and extralegal rendition and detention programs. But at the edges of this arrangement, one finds Agamben’s homo sacer, Fiskesjö’s barbarians: those excluded from the legal order, stripped of rights, subject to death at any time—the point at which an empire converts those beyond its reach into obedient subjects or corpses. This is the logic of sovereign violence taken to its most extreme—and not insignificantly, this has been accomplished in part by euphemizing that violence, whether in the sanitized parlance of the military—“focused obstruction,” “targeted killing,” “kinetic action”—or the more artful, ideological euphemization by which assassination programs become complex and debatable moral issues in the liberal press. It should come as no surprise that this has been accompanied by the infinite expansion of an apparatus of domestic surveillance and control unprecedented in human history. One should never forget that the instruments of sovereignty—drones, militarized police, mass surveillance apparatus—were always directed inwards as much as outwards, because the security state secures one thing: the safety of the sovereign above all. From the perspective of sovereign power, there is no inside and there is no outside. There is only the violence to which we are all subject. “One simple imperative: Know your enemy” The legalistic definition of sovereignty, the preoccupation with policy making, even the basic assumption that the debates we have really matter—all of this starts to look ideological in the worst sense. Following the Prism revelations last week, Christian Caryl wrote a retrospective in Foreign Policy comparing the NSA and the East German Stasi: So which is worse, the Stasi or the NSA? Definitely the Stasi. East German citizens had no defense whatsoever against its intrusions. American citizens can still exercise control over our own intelligence organizations, which are still bound (or so we are told) by the rule of law. But do we really have the will to restrain them? There is admittedly some faint courage in being willing to even make the comparison, but there is something utterly more remarkable in the ideological refrain of asking if “American citizens can still exercise control over our own intelligence organization”—as if the state’s intelligence apparatus had ever been democratic—“or so we are told.” But this is hardly uncommon. Dan Gettinger’s recent piece for the Center here frames the question in terms of legislative oversight in the application of the AUMF: Understanding this legal debate and the evolving strategic situation determines how this country deploys it’s forces abroad, the kinds of military technologies that we invest in, and the degree of oversight that Congress has over the use of force by the Executive Branch. While the outcome of this debate will likely result in some form forever war against terrorism, the question remains as to whether it will be conducted in the shadows of ambiguity or limited by some degree of Congressional observation. And here we are back at the lesser evil. It is significant, I think, that it is fundamentally impossible it is to reconcile any of this with anything like actual democracy. These are questions for policy elites—and perhaps for those who imagine themselves among their ranks. But the question is always between more killing and less killing, between more secrecy and less secrecy, more oversight and less oversight—**always witheringly loyal to the same order of violence that produced these choices in the first place**—and which never bore any of us any loyalty.

### I law

#### Cyber-wars don’t escalate – redundancy in the system reduces the threat

Posner 11 (Gary Becker and Richard Posner, 8/7/11 The Becker-Posner Blog, "The Challenge of Cyber Warfare - Posner")

Although at present defense against cyber warfare is very difficult, and indeed seemingly ineffectual, a pooling of the civilized world’s computer expertise in an international effort to secure computer networks and databases against online espionage and (especially) sabotage, as well as to create redundancy in such networks and databases that would enable their essential functions to be maintained even after a large-scale cyber attack, would certainly be a worthwhile undertaking. There are indications of cooperation between the United States and close allies such as the United Kingdom and Israel. Let us hope that international cooperation in cyber defense is expanded and adequately financed.

#### No impact to disease

Posner ‘5 (Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1, March 11, 2005)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extiinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

#### Security fears of disease cause emergency measures that are counterproductive at the domestic level and undermine critical international cooperation

Enemark ‘9 (Is Pandemic Flu a Security Threat? Author: Christian Enemark DOI: 10.1080/00396330902749798 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Published in: journal Survival, Volume 51, Issue 1 February 2009 , pages 191 - 214

Most infectious diseases do not attract heightened political attention because their effects are mild, they are familiar to physicians, or their geographic occurrence is limited. A particular disease might be deemed a security issue, however, when its effects impose or threaten to impose an intolerable burden on society. That burden can be measured in terms of morbidity and mortality, but also in terms of the way in which a disease is perceived by those who fear infection. The disease described by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as 'the most feared security threat' today is pandemic influenza.1 The next pandemic could cause illness and death on a large scale, over a wide area, in a short space of time. Such a prospect arguably sets this disease apart from the many others that may be regarded simply as health issues, and some Western governments have started to frame pandemic influenza as a threat to national security. According to the US pandemic plan, a 'necessary enabler of pandemic preparedness' is that this be viewed 'as a national security issue'.2 The 'National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom' assesses an influenza pandemic as the 'highest risk' civil emergency.3 And under the Australian pandemic plan, which emphasises 'maintenance of social functioning',4 Australians are to receive the best possible health care 'commensurate with the maintenance of a safe and secure society'.5 Historical experience indicates that the world is overdue for an influenza pandemic, and a virus with pandemic potential - H5N1 avian influenza, which emerged in late 2003 - is still out of control. Past pandemics were all the more damaging because they took the world by surprise; however, the stakes are still high in the twenty-first century because increased human interconnectedness facilitates the global spread of disease. In the first identifiable pre-pandemic phase of human history, it makes sense to be thinking seriously about how best to prepare and respond. Yet as some governments move to prioritise this health issue by framing it in security terms, two risks emerge: firstly, that emergency responses implemented at the domestic level might do more harm than good; and secondly, that placing too great an emphasis on the health and security interests of individual states might detract from the need for long-term international cooperation on resisting pandemic influenza.